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ABSTRACT
The current global capitalist system is at odds with environmental protection and
the protection of indigenous people that are directly linked to the land on which they live.
In environmental security literature, many have argued that, theoretically and
functionally, it is possible to link national security with environmental security. However
possible this may be on paper, in practice, the global capitalist system prevents this from
becoming a reality. Using a world-systems approach, this thesis will show that core
countries seeking to expand capital by tapping into new markets, locating new sources of
raw materials and even forming strategic military partnerships in periphery countries
unavoidably degrade the natural environment and thus, adversely affect the lives and
health of indigenous people. It is also the argument in this paper that the primary purpose
of strategic military partnerships with periphery states, such as those formed in Panama
and Colombia, are primarily meant to protect economic interests, thus perpetuating the
capitalist cycle. The end result is that, while it is theoretically possible, through a
different theoretical lens, to bridge the definitional and theoretical gulf between national
security and environmental security, the reality of the system subverts this endeavor, and
will continue to do so under its current configuration.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The global environment is changing. As a result of industrial processes, the
atmosphere, water supplies, food supplies and the like are becoming more and more
polluted. The countries of the first world are producing pollution at home and abroad as
they seek to increase capital and expand into foreign markets. The effects of global
environmental change, however, are predominately felt locally. That is, local
communities, often poor and indigenous communities, feel the effects not only first, but
also most intensely by processes that know no borders.
In previous scholarly work, many have argued that national security and
environmental security could be theoretically linked in such a way as to provide policy
makers the necessary justification to shift policy decisions in a more “environmentally
conscious” direction. That is, environmental security as a field of study, has sought
definitions and theoretical perspectives that allow national security and environmental
security to be merged in a way that does not dilute the meaning of either term – although
some authors vehemently deny any such linkage. Rather, for these scholars, both terms
and subsequent policy actions would be enhanced.
In this thesis, I do not challenge the fundamental arguments from the theoretical
framework in which they are organized. However, I argue that the particular framework
used is wrong when one takes the realities of world-system into account. Why is this so?
In short, the current global capitalist system does not allow for core-states, primarily
focused on increasing national wealth and capital, to make environmental security a
concern of enough prime importance to deal with such challenges. Rather, core-states
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place economic prosperity – and security which then results in stability, which in turn
leads to future economic prosperity – at the top of their list of priorities.
Using a world-systems approach pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein which is
steeped in Marxist influences, this paper will analyze the current global capitalist system
and its effects on policy. This paper will first explain the fundamental core arguments of
the previous work in detail. The paper will then make a case for why these arguments
were framed in an incorrect way and how using the world-systems approach – a critical
analysis of the global capitalist system – more accurately reflects the realities on the
ground. Further, this approach better explains why policies of core-states – specifically
the United States – do not adequately take into account the concerns – both
environmental and human health-related – of periphery and semi-periphery states and the
people within those states.
To make this point clear, a case study is necessary. The case of Panama is a place
to start. Panama is a periphery state that lies amongst other periphery states in Central
and South America. Panama is of key strategic and economic importance to the United
States because of its main asset, the Panama Canal.
U.S. interest in the canal dates far back and U.S.-Panamanian relations have longbeen centered on this key component of the international trade system. Writing in 1992,
Michael L. Conniff noted:
The U.S. alliance with Panama has lasted a century and a half, making it
the longest in both countries’ histories. Panama, moreover, always figured
larger in Americans’ consciousness than would be expected, given its
diminutive territory and population. Policing the isthmus in the nineteenth
century required the United States to maintain its first permanent overseas
naval force, which became the Caribbean Squadron in the era of gunboat
diplomacy. The United States gained its first military enclave in Latin
America with the creation of the Canal Zone and its attendant military
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bases. The controversy over Panama’s separation from Colombia and the
task of building the canal commanded U.S. attention for over a decade.
The 1977 treaties modifying the alliance caused the most heated treaty
ratification battle ever fought in the United States. And the recent
invasion constituted the largest military operation between the Vietnam
War and the Middle East crisis of 1990. For better or worse, Panama has
preoccupied the United States the way few countries have (p.4).
This paper will explore, in detail, the Panama Canal’s history – including its
construction and importance to the international economy, as well as the Panamanian
economy. Further, this paper will stress U.S. influence in the internal operations within
Panama (construction and operation of the Canal; installation of strategic military bases;
regional security alliances to protect against regional insecurity).
This paper also serves another goal: to help bring the scholarly community,
specifically the IR community, to a vantage point that allows for more critical
assessments of the world-system. Currently, most scholars miss the point when it comes
to discussing environmental and human security. Certainly, core-states (or perhaps,
groups and individuals within core-states) are concerned with environmental issues
especially as more and more are personally affected. As some argue, the growing
realization by people within states allows for more communication and cooperation to
combat environmental risks (Beck, 1992 and 1999). That being said, the reality is the
poorest people in the poorest states receive the blow first and often hardest when it comes
to environmental degradation and even natural disasters and the elite can largely escape
such risk. Understanding why this is so is essential and this paper seeks to bring the
discipline closer to that goal.
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CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
Why are “developed” states more readily able to export their environmental risks
than poorer states. And further, what mechanisms allow this to take place? This paper
seeks to answer these questions and obtain a better understanding of the current worldsystem and the how this system influences the policy of nation-states with regard to the
concept of national and environmental security. As was noted above, previous work
done in this field has argued that the two conceptions of environmental security and
national security could be merged in such a theoretical way that policy makers would
then have the justification to then translate these ideas into substantive policies.
However, this may not be the case when one considers capitalism’s role in the modern
world-system.
A review of the ideas formulated and arguments made in the environmental
security literature is necessary in order to have basis from which to then critically analyze
these ideas and arguments. Following this review, an examination of the world-systems
approach is then necessary to steer the discussion in a way that allows for one to make
the case for utilizing a different theoretical approach to this issue.
An Overview of the Theoretical Argument
As noted, previous discussions within the field were focused on linking
environmental security and national security as concepts theoretically and then translating
this into policy. This section looks at how this was done by analyzing the literature and
the theoretical framework of the field.
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Concepts of Relationship: National and Environmental Security
If one sees environmental security as a subset only of national security, then the
first response to environmental security threats, no matter the cause, would likely be
military in nature (Concept 1). On the other hand, if environmental security revolves
around resources and environmental degradation (which may lead to conflict, but might
be direct threats themselves) the response may deal with mitigation of pollution, for
instance, to the exclusion of the military (Concept 2).

Figure 1 Environmental Security Within National Security
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Figure 2 Non-Military Responses to Environmental Security Issues

A third perspective denies any link whatsoever between national and
environmental security. These are considered separate spheres altogether (Concept 3).
Luckily, almost no authors argue that all military conflict is caused by environmental
insecurity issues, and equally as unanimous is the agreement that not all national security
threats are environmental in nature. This allows one to bridge the gap between the debate,
by conceiving of security in general as a process containing subsets of national and
environmental security, and an area that contains both (and likely others, though those are
not analyzed here).
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Figure 3 Environmental Security and National Security as Mutually-Exclusive

Figure 4 The Concepts Merged with Feedback
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Conceived of this way, one can see that while national security and environmental
security may have a large overlap, there are places within each field that do not relate
directly to the other. These areas are where the insecurity of the population falls into
clearly one area or another. There is likely no military solution to most water pollution
issues, just as there is no environmental solution to invasion.
Where national and environmental security overlap is obviously part of the
contestation, but it is clear from the literature that environmental security is not only a
subset of national security and national security does not inherently affect environmental
security. It is important that the areas of overlap, as well as feedback, between the two
securities should be identified by further empirical analysis along the lines of the Toronto
Group. This would allow for some basis to determine the recalibration of security into a
more holistic concept. If scholars could explicitly acknowledge that the two securities are
related, through the similar goal of relieving insecurity, it would shift the focus of the
field away from differentiating security into smaller less effective areas, to seeing where
each can best influence policy.
Also, certain environmental problems such as hurricanes and tornadoes constitute
localized national security threats. Linking these problems with the idea of the protection
of individuals, that is, alleviating insecurity, and couching that within the national
security arena. This, it is argued, constitutes a direct link between a nation’s security,
specifically that of the U.S., and environmental security an area representative of the
feedback that is contained within the holistic security concept.
Nina Graeger puts it very well when she gives four reasons for making a
theoretical and operational linkage between security and environment.
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First, environmental degradation is in itself a severe threat to human security…
Second, environmental degradation or change can be both cause and consequence
of violent conflict…Third, predictability and control are essential elements of
military security considerations, and these are also important elements in the
safeguarding of the environment…Fourth, a cognitive linkage between the
environment and security has been established. It has become legitimate for
mainstream politicians to speak out in favor of an environmentally responsible
security policy (p.110-111).
Scholarly Literature
The above theoretical discussion was the result of good consideration of the
evolving scholarly debate regarding the linkage of environmental security and national
security as concepts with intended policy implications. This section of the chapter
discusses these scholarly debates in detail and provides a critical analysis of the previous
work done in this field.
For decades now, scholars have long debated whether, and to what extent,
environmental issues are related to security. The early work done in this field argued that
no longer should security threats be perceived strictly in military terms. As Richard H.
Ullman so eloquently explains, “Since the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s, every
administration in Washington has defined American national security in excessively
narrow and excessively military terms,” (1983, p. 129). Some argue that environmental
degradation causes security threats, namely resource wars, while others maintain that
environmental degradation itself is a human security threat in the form of food shortages
and the vulnerability that disaster brings (Foster, p. 377; Broda-Bahm, p. 159). As always
within academia, this leads to second tier arguments about the appropriate response to
environmental security.
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Previous Concepts and Definitions in Environmental Security
Currently there is a theme in the literature that revolves around the definition of
environmental security as a concept. Gregory Foster, for instance, places the debate in
this context:
Most discussions of the meaning of environmental security focus on the
nature of security – whether it is fundamentally a military phenomenon
that, by implication, would tend to render environmental concerns largely
irrelevant, or whether it is something more robust and inclusive that
logically would encompass, and perhaps even revolve around,
environmental considerations (p.375).

All of these discussions are a result of a misunderstanding of national security as a
concept, defining it too narrowly, or showing how resource scarcity leads to conflict,
making environmental security effectively a part of national security. Also, they state that
some areas of the debate also stem from the fact that security, as a concept, has no
consensus definition.
Carsten Ronnfeldt in his article Three Generations of Environment and Security
Research breaks down the history of the research in the field of environmental security
into three generations. The first generation debated “whether and how environmental
issues should be incorporated into security concerns (p.473).” Also, this generation saw
the emergence of authors who argued that a more robust definition of national security
was needed. The early work done by Richard H. Ullman (1983) called for a redefinition
of “security” to encompass a broader array of problems and threats. The fundamental
idea behind Ullman’s work was that a narrow conceptual definition of security is
dangerous in that it presents a false image of reality (1983, p. 129). Ullman highlights
two principle problems with this sort of definitional constraint:
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Defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms
conveys a profoundly false image of reality. That false image is doubly
misleading and therefore doubly dangerous. First, it causes states to
concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps more
harmful dangers. Thus it reduces their total security. And second, it
contributes to a pervasive militarization of international relations that in
the long run can only increase global insecurity (1983, p. 129).

Indeed, and undoubtedly, military threats are of great importance. What Ullman –
and others that have followed – argue is for a more sweeping definition of national
security, one that takes into account non-military threats as well as those which are
military in nature. Only then will a true conceptual understanding of security be possible.
The second generation of the discourse focused on empirical research looking at
the connections between environmental degradation and conflict and while the third
generation is still developing – which recognizes that resource scarcity is not the sole
cause of conflict and criticizes the second generation for focusing on this variable - it
seems to simply be adding more inclusive material to the second and looking at the
inverse relationship of how conflict effects the environment (p.478).
That environmental changes may be causally linked to violent conflict has been
the subject of many empirical analyses (Homer-Dixon 1991; Homer-Dixon 1994; HomerDixon 1995; Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998). Moreover, the underlying principles that
Ullman articulated in his early work back in the 1980s remain in all work seeking to link
environmental problems with security concerns. In other words, scholars who argue that
linkages exist presumably regard current conceptualizations of security as being
insufficient. Homer-Dixon indirectly makes this point when he states:
We may learn that there are real opportunities for intervention; hardship
and strife are not preordained. But it seems likely that, as environmental
degradation proceeds, the size of the potential social disruption will
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increase, while our capacity to intervene to prevent this disruption
decreases. It is therefore not a reasonable policy response to assume we
can intervene at a late stage, when the crisis is upon us (1991, p. 116).

Homer-Dixon recognizes, however, that there are problems that may arise from
trying to link environmental change with something as broad as the term “security”. He
points out that “security” is a term that opens up a vast array of sub-issues, especially if
one defines security “to include human physical, social, and economic well-being,”
(1991, p. 77). Thus, Homer-Dixon focuses on acute conflict or conflict where there is a
large probability of violence resulting from environmental change and degradation,
which ultimately will lead to things such as resource scarcity (1991, p. 77). Still,
regardless of how he frames it, ultimately, Homer-Dixon is discussing how conflict can
lead to instability and in turn, can become a security issue. For instance, Homer-Dixon
discusses that environmental pressures can cause disruptions in normal social relations
and that these disruptions “in turn, may cause several types of acute conflict, including
scarcity disputes between countries, clashes between ethnic groups, and civil strife and
insurgency, each with potentially serious repercussions for the security interests of the
developed world,” (1991, p. 78, emphasis added).
Perhaps making a stronger link (although not empirically) between environmental
degradation and U.S. security interests is Norman Myers (1989) who argues that
environmental challenges faced by those in the developing world pose security threats to
the United States as well. All too often, the result of environmental degradation and
economic disorder in the developing world, Myers states, “is civil turmoil and outright
violence, whether within a country or with neighboring countries,” and furthermore that,
“By helping key Third World countries with their environmental needs, the United States
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is helping itself,” (1989, pp. 24-25). This differs somewhat from Homer-Dixon in that
Myers identifies a link between conflict and instability in other parts of the world with
security in the United States in multiple forms; not only from violence, but from
economic turmoil as well . Myers identifies three specific cases in which U.S. security
interests are at stake and related to environmental problems: deforestation in the
Philippines, water deficits in the Middle East, and land degradation in El Salvador.
These three are all examples of where the United States has military, security and
economic interests. Thus, instability, social upheaval, and conflict pose threats to the
United States with respect to these specific interests.
Daniel Deudney provides somewhat of a digression from the main thrust of the
debate, indicating that environmental security as a concept should not be included with
national security, as it is a fundamentally different idea, neither national, nor dealing
specifically with security (Deudney, 1991).
To quote Deudney:
The fashionable recourse to national security paradigms to
conceptualize the environmental problem represents a profound and
disturbing failure of imagination and political awareness….The movement
to preserve the habitability of the planet for future generations must
directly challenge the tribal power of nationalism and the chronic
militarization of public discourse. Ecological degradation is not a threat to
national security; rather, environmentalism is a threat to national security
attitudes and institutions. When environmentalists dress their programs in
the blood-soaked garments of the war system, they betray their core values
and create confusion about the real tasks at hand (Deudney 1991, online).
He makes his arguments however, along the same lines as the other researchers,
specifically looking at national responses to environmental issues and resource/poverty
wars, questioning their viability as concepts.
Mark A. Levy makes a somewhat similar argument to Deudney, stating that,
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Others want people to engage in double counting [that is, security in both
environmental and national aspects] because they do not think that the
policies that emerge from “single counting” are adequate. If this is the
case, then the justification for linking environment and security in an
existential way lies in its effects in the competition for sound bites on the
evening news and in political campaigns and, by extension, in the
competition for budgetary and other scarce resources (p.44).

Many of the arguments contained within the environmental security literature are
definitional in nature. What exactly is environmental security, how is it applied? “For the
critic as well as for the philosopher, definitions are most productively thought of as
arguments (Broda-Bahm, p.160),” and environmental security is no exception to this rule.
In fact, half of the argument around the definition of environmental security revolves
around the redefinition of a nearly equally contested term, national security. Foster
indicates these definitional issues have comprised the majority of the literature (p.375).
Discussions of what level at which security applies, individual, state,
international, and of what comprises security abound, and there is also quite extensive
discussion about what exactly constitutes the environment.
In his paper Is the Environment a National Security Issue, Marc A. Levy states,
Whether or not one accepts the definitions offered here, one conclusion is
inescapable. The literature to date has either failed to offer definitions at
all, or has offered plainly self serving and close-minded ones. If there is to
be any serious consideration of environmental threats by the security
studies and security policy communities, we need more thoughtful
consideration of how to define the potential common ground (p.37).

Unfortunately, Levy’s definition excludes a large number of resources that
normally would be considered part of the environment from his definition. His definition
of environment limits environmental security issues to only “those that involve biological
processes that include ecological feedbacks and equilibria (sic.)” (Levy, p.38). This
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limitation is symptomatic of what Levy argues are the problems with the definitions
already contained within the literature; it suits only the author’s needs. As an example,
Levy’s definition would not include petroleum. In addition, Levy argues that there must
be a direct, empirical link between environmental security and national security, an
existential link is not enough for a reassessment of national security concerns in Levy’s
mind (p. 43).
Part of the problem among all the authors is a conflation of terms. Environmental
security is not the same as environmental degradation. Environmental security deals with
environmental degradation and scarcity. We can see a parallel in national security. When
one speaks of national security, one is usually referring to “the decisions and actions
deemed imperative to protect domestic core values [and property] from external [or
internal] threats (Leffler, p. 143).” One then is not dealing with war itself, but the
decisions and actions used to prevent war (for instance). Looking at the literature
however, one does not see the same differentiation within the discussion about
environmental security.
This difference in the discussions about environmental and national security
partially differs due to the somewhat backwards focus on security. The literature tends to
utilize the concept of security, national or environmental, however defined, as the starting
point. This blurs the connections between the two largely because the similar areas of
concern focus around the concept of insecurity, a related but different concept.
As the third stage of environmental security studies is still developing, it is
important to begin by focusing on where the second stage has brought the field, and reevaluate it in light of the above discussion. Again turning to Rønnfeldt, one can see that
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this generation was focused on tracing the process of environmental degradation to
conflict (p.474). The authors, particularly of the Toronto Group (led by Thomas HomerDixon), sought to provide empirical evidence that environmental issues led to conflict
and therefore had national security implications. Their findings have tended to imply that
because resource scarcity can lead to conflict, environmental issues, to a large extent,
should be considered within the security sphere.
Soroos agrees, “Theoretical arguments focus on empirical cause-and-effect
relationships, in particular the potential of major environmental changes to generate and
intensify conflict between and within states (p.318).”
In addition to their cause and effect nature, the arguments in the second
generation often focused around the issue of scarcity, a limited resource with competition
for it. Water, cropland, fish stocks and the like were considered the independent variables
with conflict as the dependent (Ronnfeldt, p.476). Again it should be noted that there is
conflation between the causal relationships and the concept of environmental security.
There are important implications that result from this view. It begs the question of
whether a nation can intervene in another to stop environmental degradation if it is
deemed that it may later lead to conflict. In addition, if environmental security is
contained wholly within national security, it changes the responsibility from civilian to
military, each area of responsibility having wholly different policy communities and
dealing with different insecurities. It also changes the way one approaches questions
within environmental security (Barnett, 2001).
All of the literature focuses on the practical aspects of environmental security as
affecting national security. It seems that no matter where a scholar comes down within
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the argument, there is an acknowledged relationship between the two concepts. Though
there are those who feel that this relationship is only useful insofar as it brings
environmental issues some more prescience, the majority of the literature is focused on
the gap between the definitions that, to an extent, can be bridged. There is also a second
arena where the comparison of environmental and national security is highly appropriate.
Coming from the rational choice school of thought, it conceives of national security as
public goods.
Public goods are non-rival, non-excludable goods. That is, once the good is
provided, no one can be excluded from it and someone’s enjoyment of the good does not
lessen another’s. In most cases these goods are provided by government because private
businesses cannot provide the good at “an appropriate price to cover the cost of resources
used to provide that service [good] (Mikesell, 3).” National security is the quintessential
public good, and is very likely the most cited example of one, though it is likely that all
of environmental security falls squarely within the public goods category as well.
Pollution reduction for instance, is a public good (if it is provided). As is the case with
national security, environmental security is neither excludable nor rival.
This is an angle that has been explored before, though mostly in the context of
human security. If a government has the same responsibilities towards environmental
security as national security, it means there needs to be an essential reevaluation of the
place that environmental security holds within the policy sphere. By viewing
environmental security as a public good, there is a tacit acknowledgment that the
government must take responsibility for it, as one of the characteristics of a public good
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is that it cannot usually be provided by a private interest, less so a group of private
interests.
This additional theoretical similarity merely adds to the idea that the spheres of
environmental and national security can be combined on some level, and thus further
supports the argument for a holistic security concept containing both. It is important to
understand that this does not mean a militarization of the environment as authors like
Deudney argue (1991) nor does it mean the swallowing up of national security issues
within environmental concerns. It does, however, mean that responsibility for the
alleviation of insecurity must take into account both national and environmental
concerns, or there has been a dereliction of duty on the part of the U.S. government.
There is an argument that is consistently cited within the literature critical of
environmental security that the link between environment and security is just smoke and
mirrors (Levy, 1995). The argument continues that the reason for this false linkage is so
those who have environmental concerns can get the same attention that is given to
security. This is false because, as shown above, those same critics acknowledge at least a
tacit linkage between the two concepts.
The concept of environmental security has been criticized for its normative
connotations…Mixing political activism with research is not in itself a problem as
long as the two can be kept as analytically distinct categories – as in peace
research, conceptualized as research on and for peace. The traditional security
paradigm also has strong normative connotations – for example, seeing the
nation-state as a territorial and organizational form to be defended with no need of
further legitimation (Graeger, 113).

If then, there are strong areas in common between environmental and national
security, and they can be thought of as the same type of issue, and suffering from similar
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normative burdens, why has the both the literature as well as the policy thus far treated
them as separate?
Part of the answer lies in the areas in each of the respective concepts that are not
contained within both. As noted above, not all national security issues have an
environmental component. Intelligence gathering, essential to national security, has little
to no relation to environmental problems just as beach erosion has little to no effect on
national security. Too often those areas have been the focus of the discussion. In a
published communication between Marc A. Levy and Thomas Homer-Dixon, the focus
of the conversation is on methodology; specifically what cases should be selected for
study. Each one of the cases focuses on scarcity issues.
This focus on scarcity is due to the fact that Homer-Dixon is using concept 1
(figure 1) as his base. In order for something to be contained within National Security, on
some level it must lead to conflict. Focusing on conflict as the base of an argument over
environmental security guarantees that it will be contained within the national security
sphere. This stands in contrast to the holistic security concept above. While scarcity
issues that lead to conflict will certainly be looked at within a national security scope, it
changes the focus away from conflict per se, and sees other security issues that result
directly from environmental issues.
Environmental degradation and violence pose very different types of threats. Both
may kill people and may reduce human well-being, but not all threats to life and
property are threats to security. Disease, aging, and accidents routinely destroy
life and property, but we do not think of them as threats to security. And when an
earthquake or hurricane causes extensive damage, it is customary to speak of
natural disasters, but not to speak about such events as threatening national
security (Deudney, 1991).
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This argument Deudney makes actually supports the above. He is essentially
arguing that because none of the things he mentions leads to conflict, that they should not
be considered within a security framework. In addition, his argument assumes only
purposeful intent of damage constitutes a security threat.
Graeger shows how the above conceptions of environmental security must be
overcome:

A new concept of security that includes the environment seems to be justified. On
the other hand, ‘environmental security’ cannot be completely dismissed as a
concept just because no single definition has been universally accepted. Indeed,
different definitions may serve different purposes. Rather than looking for a new
definition of environmental security, we should define its various zones or areas
of application. This includes the various components of the concept as well as the
appropriate levels for dealing with environmental security. Components of
environmental security include military preparedness, technological and industrial
installations and other activities that may damage the environment in a way that
creates a security threat without necessarily leading to overt conflict. Determining
the extent of such threats must be based on detailed empirical studies (p.115).
Point of Departure
Perhaps where previous discussions fail is in their inability to fully and adequately
explain why theory does not translate into policy. There is no real explanation of why
those in Washington, D.C. – the policy makers – fail to deliver sound environmental
security policies. It is implied that this is because there is little theoretical basis for doing
so. It is also implied as more and more people focus on environmental problems, this
could change, even noting that many public, administration officials in recent years have
addressed some of these issues, even if rhetorically. Lastly, the above discussions hint
that there is a difference between policy from administration to administration, noting
that the administration of George W. Bush has largely rolled back – or is attempting to
roll back - many key pieces of environmental legislation.
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What the above discussion fails to show is that there really is not a serious
discussion of actual policy, regardless of administration. Further, there is no real sound
explanation as to why this is the case, leaving one to wonder why this appears to be so.
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CHAPTER THREE: A NEW THEORETICAL VANTAGE POINT
In order to have a better understanding of why these theories that have been
developed over the years fail to explain the lack of sound environmental security policy
on the part of the United States – or many “developed” states for that matter - it is
necessary to look at the problem from an entirely new and fresh theoretical perspective.
In no way is there disagreement, fundamentally, with the previous discussions’ basic
theoretical premises; it is possible to theoretically and conceptually link environmental
security and national security as concepts. The usefulness of these theories, however, is
what is in question in this chapter. Theories are only as good as their explanatory power,
and previous work in the field offers little in the way of explanation, often where scholars
argue is most important: in spheres of policy.
Thus, a new theoretical framework will be explained in this section that allows for
a better explanation of the current state of the world-system. Specifically, this paper will
utilize a world-systems approach, focusing on the global capitalist system. This
theoretical framework was pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein and an overview of his
contributions is now necessary. World-Systems theory provides a new, fresh theoretical
vantage point that can provide an explanation for why developed states – referred to as
“core” states – often fail to employ sound environmental security policies, specifically
when it comes to their international business and security practices abroad, primarily in
the lesser-developed states, or the periphery.
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Wallerstein’s World-Systems Approach
Wallerstein defines a world-system as a “social system, one that has boundaries,
structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the
conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks
eternally to remold it to its advantage,” (1976, p. 229). Further, he states that worldsystems are further defined by their self-containment as a primarily economic-material
entity which is based on an “extensive division of labor and that they contain within them
a multiplicity of cultures,” (1976, p. 299). Not to be confused with a world-empire,
Wallerstein distinguishes the two by arguing that the main difference is that worldempires are those in which a single political system reigns over most of the area that falls
under the umbrella of the empire. Instead, specifically within the capitalist world-system,
the capitalism upon which it is ruled by economic factors operate within an arena larger
than that which any political entity can totally control (Wallerstein 1976, p. 230).
Structure of the Capitalist World-System
In Wallerstein’s world-systems approach – in a way that mirrors classical
Marxism – there is a division of labor. However, Wallerstein differs from Marx in one
key area. Whereas Marx argued that the unequal division of labor was based on
occupation, Wallerstein argues that the division of labor – while to some degree is based
on occupation – is primarily based upon geographic location (1976, p. 230). Why is this
so? For Wallerstein, this is a function of the “social organization of work, one which
magnifies and legitimizes the ability of some groups within the system to exploit the
labor of others, that is, to receive a larger share of the surplus,” (1976, p. 230). In this
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world-system culture is linked to geographic, spatial location. Thus, certain homogenous
groups can exert pressure in order to develop cultural-national identities. It can therefore
be envisioned that certain groups will, over time, develop a more advantageous position
within the world-system. And according to Wallerstein, this is indeed the case.

Core-States
Core-states within the capitalist world-system are in an advantageous position for
a multitude of reasons, not the least of which is their economic superiority over other
states and areas. These states have a national, cultural identity which moves parallel with
strong state “machinery” which allows for the protection against “disparities that have
arisen within the world-system,” and also serves as an “ideological mask and justification
for the maintenance of these disparities,” (Wallerstein 1976, p. 231). In essence, core
states direct the flow of capital in the system to their benefit.
One can envision the core states. Examples of such states are the United States,
the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan. These states, and others like them,
have amassed the vast majority of capital amongst themselves. The rest of the world
strives to make it into the “core”.
Periphery-States and Areas
In stark contrast to core states are the peripheral states, or what Wallerstein
termed peripheral “areas”. Wallerstein avoided using the term “state” because, in reality,
often there are areas of exploitation that are, in effect, “stateless”. Examples of these
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would be colonial situations, as was the case with many of the colonies of the United
Kingdom in the latter part of the nineteenth century, moving into the twentieth century.
These indigenous states, even if they have gained independence from their
colonial powers (as most have), remain weak and have a “low degree of autonomy”
within the world-system (Wallerstein 1976, p. 231). Examples of periphery states would
be most of the states within the formerly British and Ottoman-controlled Middle East
(Jordan, Iraq, Syria, etc) and virtually all of sub-Saharan Africa.

Semi periphery-States
In addition to the core and periphery states, there is, in between, a category of
state which plays a vital structural role in the organization of the world-system. These
states are sometimes the result of core states falling from the core or periphery states that
Wallerstein terms have been “promoted” (1976, p.231).
The main function of these states, in addition to providing expanded economic
capabilities, is they act as a buffer or an intermediary between the core and periphery in a
number of vital geopolitical areas. As Wallerstein points out:
These middle areas (like middle groups in an empire) partially deflect the
political pressures which groups primarily located in peripheral areas
might otherwise direct against core-states and the groups which operate
within and through their state machineries. On the other hand, the interests
primarily located in the semiperiphery are located outside the political
arena of the core-states, and find it difficult to pursue the ends in political
coalitions that might be open to them were they in the same political arena
(1976, p. 231).
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In another way, these semiperiphery states exploit the periphery as well. For example,
the British imported cotton from India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and Spain imported gold and silver from the Americas, both operations often done under
coercive measures.
Much like with classic Marxism, in the world-systems approach, there is a
hierarchy of the division of labor. However, differing from Marx, Wallerstein sees this
again, geographically. Also differing from Marx, where the basic hierarchy was twotiered, the world-system is has three tiers: the core, the semiperiphery and the periphery.
They can be visualized using this illustration:

Figure 5 World-System Hierarchy
Source: Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Terry Boswell 2002

At the top of the hierarchy, the core-states possess skills, technology and capital
which differ from that of the semiperiphery and periphery. These skills and technology
are more valued than those in the semiperiphery and periphery and the occupations those
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within these states match. Often, the means of production lie in the periphery and
semiperiphery primarily. Skilled labor and the owners of capital, on the contrary, reside
more predominately in the core states. Thus, the owners of production are often in states
other than those that manufacture the products. Further, as Wallerstein explains, “a
capitalist world-economy essentially rewards accumulated capital, including human
capital, at a higher rate than "raw" labor power,” (1976, p. 232). Being that these
differences are geographically and culturally pre-determined, there is a geographical
maldistribution of skills in the system. Furthermore, the world-system lends itself to
maintain these situations, rather than change them, with core-states seeking to remain in
the core; the marketplace reinforces these divisions.
One key thing to make note of here is that there is no central political institution
that absolutely governs this world-economy. Thus, it is very difficult for groups or
processes to intervene in the system with the hopes of redistributing the “rewards” of the
system.
Looking at the world through the world-systems framework allows one to address
questions, like those in this paper, from an entirely different theoretical vantage point.
The Marxist roots are apparent and obvious. But world-systems analysis succeeds where
Marxism fails. Classical Marxism predicted the fall of states after revolutions of the
proletariat. Leninist-Marxism predicted that states will offset the revolution by
expanding into new markets and sources of raw material. Thus, Leninist-Marxism proves
a formidable foundation for the world-systems approach.
As Wallerstein himself notes:
The ongoing process of a world-economy tends to expand the economic
and social gaps among its varying areas in the very process of its
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development. One factor that tends to mask this fact is that the process of
development of a world-economy brings about technological advances
which make it possible to expand the boundaries of a world-economy. In
this case, particular regions of the world may change their structural role
in the world-economy, to their advantage, even though the disparity of
reward between different sectors of the world-economy as a whole may be
simultaneously widening. It is in order to observe this crucial phenomenon
clearly that we have insisted on the distinction between a peripheral area
of a given world-economy and the external arena of the world-economy.
The external arena of one century often becomes the periphery of the next,
or its semiperiphery. But then too core-states can become semiperipheral
and semiperipheral ones peripheral (1976, p. 232).

World-Systems Explanation of Negligible Environmental Security Policy
Because core-states have accumulated the most wealth, they are the most
powerful. Core-states have the strongest economies, core infrastructures and militaries.
They can continue to expand their economies in a variety of ways. One way to do this is
to secure sources of raw materials, or access to raw materials. Another way is to secure
primary trade routes and points of exchange. Insecurity disrupts the global capitalist
system. As was earlier noted, but probably not highlighted enough, is the fact that corestates, such as the United States are increasingly preoccupied with regional security in the
“developing” world. Economic security is the prime goal here with perpetuation of the
normal flow of operations within the world capitalist system.
Where core-states must weigh environmental degradation against economic gain,
they will always side with the latter. There are a number of examples of this throughout
history – deforestation in tropical rainforests in the Amazon River basin in Brazil to
create farmland, whose products often are shipped back to core-states for consumption, is
but one obvious example.
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For purposes of this paper, one case study will be conducted. Panama makes a
great case, once again, for its economic importance. Coupled with this, it has vast
environmental and natural assets. The case of Panama will highlight the lengths core
states, specifically the U.S., will go to protect their economic interests, even going as far
as environmental degradation, pollution and harming human health. Further, these
periphery and semi periphery states (such as Panama, being a semi-periphery state) are
locked into the system and thus cannot do anything but “go with the tide” of capitalism as
it dictates that Panama must maintain the Panama Canal, even if it means destroying its
natural environmental assets.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PANAMANIAN CASE
When choosing a case study for this paper, it was essential to find a state that
possesses three fundamental features. First, the state must have key environmental
resources that the people of the country – especially the marginalized and indigenous
people – are fundamentally tied to, whether that tie be through agriculture, hunting,
tourism, or culture (or some combination of these and other factors). Second, the state
must have key features that make it appealing to outside foreign investment and interests.
Often, these same environmental resources that so many poor and indigenous rely on are
the same resources that core states and their multinational corporations so aggressively
seek to exploit. Third, the state must be, at the very least, a semi-periphery state in the
world-systems hierarchy.
When utilizing these three features to aid in the search for a case, many cases
make logical candidates, but for purposes of this paper, Panama is an ideal choice.
Panama is a semi-periphery state that has been the interest of core states for well over a
century due to its location and natural resources. This chapter highlights Panama’s
appeal and importance within the global capitalist system.
Panama in the World-System
Perhaps the most fundamental basis for a cross-Isthmus transportation route in Panama
was the discovery of gold in California in 1849. As John Lindsay-Poland (2003) points
out, this event “led thousands of foreigners eager for wealth – U.S. citizens prominent
among them – to trek across Panama, the shortest land route between the Atlantic and

30

Pacific coasts,” (p. 13). What resulted within what is now Panama was a dramatic
economic boom in coastal cities such as Colon and Panama City.
In a sign of things to come – also highlighting something that world-systems
theory predicts –many local whites reaped the financial rewards, building housing in
country as they accumulated wealth.
It was soon obvious that, with the shear numbers of people making the trek, a
faster route was needed. The Pacific Mail Steamship Company obtained a contract to
build a railway cutting through the isthmus utilizing the labor of imported Chinese, Irish
and others, but predominately black workers from the Caribbean (Lindsay-Poland 2003,
p. 14).
In typical capitalist fashion, the end of the construction of the railway left
thousands of black laborers jobless. In a volatile post-construction environment, tensions
between Americans and Panamanians were high, which culminated during this period
with the so-called “Watermelon Riot” of 1856. This incident resulted in the deaths of
sixteen passengers at a rail station and almost led the U.S. to send Army troops in to
settle the dispute.
As can be seen, from the outset, the Panamanian Isthmus has been of long
importance. The discussion above highlights the early U.S. involvement in Panama.
This involvement has included everything from military presence to Canal construction.
This chapter discusses the history of the Panama Canal and its economic importance. The
following chapter will discuss in more detail security concerns within Panama on the part
of the United States and will highlight the actions taken by the United States.
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Subsequently, a discussion will be given highlighting the increasing environmental
concerns that are being raised in lieu of U.S. military presence within Panama.
The Panama Canal and its Importance to the Capitalist World-System
The Panama Canal has had a long history, one that has seen, for much of that
history, the responsibility of control and oversight resting in the hands of an outside
power, the United States. Only recently did Panama take control of the Canal, owning all
the responsibilities – and problems – that comes with that control. The Canal’s history is
long and dates back far into the nineteenth century.
The nineteenth century saw many developments in trade, technology and
communications that led to increased attention being paid to Central America. Also, the
nineteenth century saw an emergence of a new sense of independence in much of Latin
America, particularly Central America. As Thomas M. Leonard (1993) notes, “As the
Spanish American independence movements gained momentum in the 1810s, the call for
the United States recognition of the new republics increased,” (p. 54). Leonard also goes
on to explain how even the famous 19th Century U.S. statesman, known as “ The Great
Compromiser”, Henry Clay envisioned a great potential for new markets in the former
Spanish colonies.
The United States paid little attention to the isthmus until shortly after 1810 when
Colombia received independence from Spain. Up until this time, United States trade
relations focused mostly on Europe, Brazil, and the Caribbean (Leonard 1993, p. 54).
Recognizing Colombia at this time also meant indirectly recognizing Panama, which was,
at the time, a part of the Colombian state.
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Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, U.S. and British relations were
strained with regard to the isthmus at Panama. With the United States being granted
unrestricted transit of passengers and cargo over the isthmus in 1846 1 , the British became
alarmed. Later, in 1849, soon-to-be President Zachary Taylor commanded his Secretary
of State, John Clayton, to protest British claims in the area (Leonard 1993, p. 56). After
much bickering and debate followed by negotiations, the British and American
governments reached an agreement. In 1850, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty pledged that
each government would not “assume a dominion over and part of Central America,”
(Leonard 1993, p. 57). The reality of the treaty was that it merely put on hold plans for
construction of a canal on the isthmus. In the meantime, a functioning railroad acted as
the link between East and West in terms of trade and passenger transportation.
Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps undertook the Canal project as a private
entrepreneur in 1879. Many in the United States feared that the Caribbean Sea would be
turned into an American Mediterranean, referring to constant conflict in that sea (Leonard
1993, p. 59). The project headed by de Lesseps continued for eight years, but ultimately
failed. Further, private projects headed by Americans were also failing in the area and
also in Nicaragua. Soon, calls for a government controlled canal would grow even
louder.
The Colombian government played a key role during this period. The Colombian
government was seeing little return from the railroad on the isthmus and feared U.S.
expansion into its territory. This lead the negotiations between the two governments to
end in frustration, with the Colombian government calling for the United States to seek
alternate routes, i.e. through Nicaragua, give greater financial concessions for the
1

See Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty of 1846.
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Colombian resource if used, and a better definition of sovereignty rights to be given
(Leonard 1993, p. 63). Also, obviously, Panamanians were concerned. They saw great
opportunity in a Canal through Panama, and feared the U.S. would give up and go to
Nicaragua for their canal. In 1903, Panamanians selected Manuel Amador Guerror to
head to Washington to meet with U.S. officials 2 . After negotiations, Amador left with
assurances that the U.S. would recognize and respect Panamanian independence, thus
setting the stage for a revolt against Colombia.
The revolt occurred November 4, 1903 assisted by U.S. Naval ships that arrived
in Colón which protected the uprisings. Amador was able to recruit 500 “bought”
Colombian troops and the local fire department to ignite the revolt (Leonard 1993, p. 64).
A few days later, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that he had taken Panama,
following the successful revolution.
The treaty that followed was incredibly one-sided. Panamanians were asked to
give up the rights to a large section of their land. This also included giving control to the
United States over canal construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection
as well as lands and water sources outside of the canal “zone”. Panamanians received
$10 million and an annual payment of $250,000 for these rights. Unfortunately, they
were in no place to protest or negotiate, for the U.S. threatened to pull out of the territory
and allow for Colombia to return to deal with Panama and those who had revolted. Thus,
the treaty was signed and construction began soon thereafter.
Construction proved to be long and difficult. Diseases such as malaria needed to
be dealt with. Sanitation problems also arose. However, these problems were addressed

2

Interesting of note, Amador is now the name of a section of Panama City, near the Canal, on the Bay of
Panama.
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and construction continued. In Washington, debates also arose, centered mainly on how
to oversee the Canal and who should be appointed to manage the Canal once completed
and in what capacity. However, in 1912, the Panama Canal Act was signed which
abolished the role the Canal Commission had played during construction. In its place, a
governor would be appointed by the president to govern the Canal in four-year terms. If
war broke out, the Canal could be handed over to an Army officer, selected by the White
House (Major 1993, p 73). Such was the basic structure of governance that lasted for the
remainder of the twentieth century. What once began in the hot, tropical jungles as
merely more than an idea soon became one of the man-made wonders of the world that
helped to establish a successful economy in Central America and a hub for global
commerce. The next section will serve to briefly describe how the Canal functions. This
helps to better understand the physical environment of the Canal Zone, plus it illustrates
the current capacity problems the Canal is facing.
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Design of the Canal
The Panama Canal lies in the Rio Chagres Basin on the Isthmus of Panama. As
Stanley Heckadon Moreno explains:
The historical Chagres River Basin, which serves as the basin for the
Panama Canal, extends some 3,260 kilometers in length and is not only
the most important river basin in Panama but also one of the most strategic
river basins in the world. Its two major lakes – Gatún and Alhajeula –
function as reservoirs for the water needed to operate the inter-oceanic
canal as well as to supply the water requirements of both Panama City and
Colón, urban concentrations that contain more than half of the country’s
population. (Moreno 1993, p. 129).

Both Lakes Gatún and Alhajeula were manmade creations. Gatún was created in 1913 by
damming the Rio Chagres at its Atlantic end to aid in flooding the area for the Canal.
Alhajeula was created in 1934 for similar purposes, but by damming the Madden River in
the high mountainous areas of the country.
The design of the Canal is fairly straightforward. The Canal acts almost as a twoway street with ships being able to pass in either direction. The Canal operates on a
system of locks which serve to raise and lower water levels to allow for passage of ships.
The three sets of locks, beginning on the Atlantic side are Gatun Locks, the Pedro Miguel
Locks, and the Miraflores Locks. The three sets of locks of the two-lane Canal work as
water elevators that lift the ships to the level of Gatun Lake, 26 meters over sea level, and
later lower them again to sea level on the other side of the Isthmus of Panama 3 . The
Canal functions in almost all-weather. Fortunately, Panama has been spared from major
storms such as hurricanes due to its location.

3

Taken from the Panama Canal Authority’s website.
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The Canal currently is able to pass 37 ships per day, in both directions. This is
interesting since it takes roughly 8-10 hours for a ship to completely transit the canal.
The two-way system of the Canal, however, speeds up the process. The Panama Canal
requires extremely large amounts of water to function. Each lock requires, on average,
52 million gallons of water. This is only a small portion, however, of the total amount of
water extracted each day from the Rio Chagres Basin. Some 2,800 million gallons of
water are extracted daily from the Basin (Moreno 1993, p. 130). The 2,800 million
gallon figure is a bit outdated, however. Moreno (1993) explains how this figure was
expected to increase due to population growth to be around 4,000 million gallons by the
year 2000. No current estimation of total watershed usage could be found.
The Canal faces growing capacity problems. Two new terms are now introduced:
Panamax and Post-Panamax. Panamax refers to the maximum size a ship can be and
still pass through the Panama Canal. Post-Panamax refers to those ships built since,
which are larger than the maximum size, thus they are unable to pass through the Canal.
There has been a steady rise in the number of Panamax ships passing through the Canal,
from 4,198 in 1999 to 5,329 in 2004. The Canal Authority has managed to deal with
these issues by implementing the two-way passage and utilizing the ability to have
nighttime transits instead of daytime only transits 4 .
Only until recently has this posed any significant problem, as there were not a
large number of Post-Panamax ships in the world. However, Post-Panamax ships are
bigger and faster, and thus, more attractive to shipping companies seeking to carry goods
around the world in the most speedy and efficient manner. According to a report in Latin
Finance, currently there are 248 Post-Panamax ships on order from the world’s shipping
4

Lloyd’s List, March 18, 2005

37

lines for delivery starting in 2006 and international ports are launching plans to meet and
accommodate their size and capacity 5 What this means for Panama is that the nation
finds itself in a predicament. To expand or not to expand? Before venturing into a
discussion of the expansion plans, I feel it is necessary to explain the environmental and
biological makeup and importance of the Canal Watershed area in Panama.
The Canal Watershed
Panama’s climate is typical of tropical areas. For the most part, Panama
experiences heavy amounts of seasonal rain. There is a dry season which runs from
about January through May, with the remainder of the defined by typical tropical rains.
Annual rainfall is estimated to range anywhere from 110-152 inches (Moreno 1993, p
131).
The biodiversity in Panama, particularly in the watershed area is extremely great.
The Canal sits in the center of one of the most biological diverse areas in the world, and
apart from Amazonia and the northern and central Andes, Southern Central America has
more forest bird species than any other region in the world (Condit et al 2001, p. 389).
Also, Panama has as many plant species per 10,000 km2 as any region in the world, even
more than Amazonia and the Malay Peninsula (Condit et al 2001, p. 389).
Richard Condit and numerous other colleagues, including Stanley Heckadon
Moreno, published the findings of a report based on a project for monitoring the Panama
Canal area. This source will be used primarily for discussion on the biodiversity of the
Canal area.

5

Latin Finance, February, 2005
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To begin, the forests themselves in the Canal Basin are extremely diverse. Tree
inventories have been conducted in recent years and the numbers are staggering.
According to a recent inventory (Condit 2001) there are 983 species of tree in the area
surrounding the Canal. Of that number, over 200 had not been previously recorded in the
watershed, which suggests that there still may very well be countless species of tree left
undiscovered at this time (Condit et al 2001, p. 392).
The diversity of the bird population in the Canal Watershed area is also extremely
impressive. According to Condit et al (2001), 650 species of bird are known in the Canal
Watershed, which represents about two-thirds of the Panamanian avifauna (p. 393).
Worthy of note is the fact that some 226 species of the total 650 are restricted to forests
and are at most risk from deforestation (Condit et al 2001, p. 393). What is troubling is
that not all of the bird species fall under the protection of Panama’s National Park
System. As Condit and his colleagues point out:
Although only a handful of species are known to have disappeared from
the canal watershed and neighboring forests in the decades since the
canal’s completion, failing to protect a significant majority of the
remaining forest tracts on both the Caribbean and Pacific slopes will
certainly cause further reduction in regional levels of avian diversity.
Long-term maintenance of bird species diversity in the canal watershed
will therefore require preservation of large forest tracts from ocean to
ocean and reestablishment of a forested corridor from the lowlands of the
canal area to the Chagres lowlands and foothills (2001, p. 394).
Amphibians are also diverse in the watershed area. However, they seem to be
fairing better than the diverse avian population. There are 93 species of amphibians in
the Canal Watershed area, and all but one of those species occurs in a protected area
(Condit et al 2001, p. 394). Condit and his colleagues point out that, while there have
been drastic declines in amphibian populations at sites throughout the world, within
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Panama there does not appear to have been any such decline (p. 394). However, it does
seem to make sense to assume that any larger scale alteration to forest tracts in the
watershed and Canal Basin could have the potential to drastically change this trend,
especially if forest and natural wildlife protection are not given priority 6 . These issues
must be addressed and adequately assessed when investigating the feasibility of any sort
of expansion of the Canal.
Economic Issues
When a developing nation takes on such an enormous task as the Panama’s Canal
expansion project, there are multiple areas which need attention and investigation. The
environmental side of the problem has been addressed in this paper. Now the focus of
this paper will turn to economic issues which need to be addressed.
Panama’s estimated 2004 GDP was $20.57 billion, according to the CIA 7 . The
make up of that figure rests largely on Panama’s ever-expanding service sector, which
accounts for roughly four-fifths of the nation’s economy. Of all the different services,
operation of the Panama Canal makes up the largest chunk of the country’s economy.
Followed by banking, insurance and tourism, operation of the Panama Canal has been the
most fundamental asset to Panama’s economy. In fact, it can (and has) been argued
(Varela, 1998), without much disagreement, that without the Canal and the migration to
the Canal Zone - as well as the Colón Duty Free Zone - the service sector would not

6

For anyone interested in biodiversity in Panama, and planning to visit the region, I recommend visiting
Summit Gardens in Gamboa, just outside of Panama City. They offer species rehabilitation projects in
addition to having on display a wide variety of wildlife. In particular, the Harpy eagle project is very
impressive.
7
See CIA World Fact book www.cia.gov
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have arisen as rapidly and the economy would not have boomed they way it has since
construction. Varela puts it best:
….since the construction of the Panama Canal in 1914, uneven economic
and regional development emerged in the Republic of Panama as a result
of the increasing service function of Panama’s economy and the
concentration of its economic activities in one specific geographic area:
the adjacent territory of the Panama Canal…this situation generated the
rapid development of Panama City and its surrounding areas within the
Province of Panama, creating what became the Metropolitan Area of
Panama (Varela 1998, p. 5).

Most of the money that comes in from operating the Canal comes in the form of toll
revenues. Ships pay a toll based on their size and weight, and these fees are the largest
part of the Canal revenue equation. Toll revenues for the Panama Canal for the 2004
fiscal year surpassed the $1 billion mark for the first time 8 . Canal revenues are the
backbone of Panama’s economy. Without the Canal and the income that follows,
Panama would not be were it is today.
As with many developing nations, Panama has a large debt to payoff.
Canal expansion could plunge the country further into debt. However, Ricuarte Vasquez,
a former deputy administrator of the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) and now Minister of
Finance seeks to calm citizens and says that taxpayers will not be expected to finance the
expansion project. He further says, “The expansion of the Panama Canal should be
financed by tolls and the income that it generates,” 9 However, it remains unclear
whether this message has permeated down to the people of Panama. With the riots
during the summer of 2006 in Panama City over proposed social security reform, the

8
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Panamanian citizenry will most likely be at least a little more than apprehensive on this
topic.
Mr. Vasquez indicates that the expansion should be financed by increases in tolls
charged to ships making the voyage through the canal. This seems easy enough; divert
the burden of payment from the people to the shipping companies. However, it would be
foolish to think that shipping companies would take on this added cost without protest or
looking for alternatives. Recently, the Canal Authority has changed the ways the
container shipping industry will be charged to cross the Canal. What this does is bring in
an additional $185 million dollars in Canal revenue 10 . However, this change was seen by
the shipping companies as a possible sign of things to come. Shipping companies expect
some increases in tolls to pay for an expanded Canal. However, they also expect that
such increases should not be over and above what will be necessary to keep international
shipping and international trade operating at an optimum capacity, without passing costs
further down the line to consumers. Shipping companies can be expected to find the
most cost-effective way to transport their good around the world to their customers. If
toll fees are seen as being too high, they will look elsewhere. For example, if it is more
cost-effective to bypass the Panama Canal altogether and use faster, larger ships to travel
around the tip of South America, then one should expect shipping companies to do so.
Further, if utilizing the Suez Canal more frequently will be cost-effective, then companies
should be expected to go that route as well. Another option which is greatly garnering
attention of the shipping industry is the possibility of utilizing the so-called “Northwest
Passage” in the Arctic which may become navigable as global warming continues. This
possibility would greatly reduce shipping times.
10

Lloyds List International, March 18, 2005

42

Some estimates put toll increases at nearly four-fold to pay for Canal expansion,
which could reduce the Canal’s competitiveness against alternatives, such as the Suez
Canal 11 . Large shipping companies like Maersk-Sealand and Costco, if given no other
options, will find an alternate route to cost-effective shipping practices. One has to
wonder whether a four-fold increase in toll fees will be acceptable to the shipping
industry.
The Nicaraguan Option
It has already been mentioned in the previous section that shipping companies
might rely more on the Suez Canal for shipping if they are asked to pay too hefty of a
price to transit the Panama Canal. Railways might also be another alternative to get
goods across the isthmus at a cheaper price. However, another alternative may soon be
on the horizon. For years, the Nicaraguan government and numerous other countries
have shown interest in developing some sort of inter-oceanic crossing within the Central
American country. If put into motion and subsequently completed, this possibility could
spell the end of the line for the Panama Canal.
Interest in Nicaragua as a crossing point dates back to the 19th Century. Around
the same time Panama was being investigated for its potential, Nicaragua was also being
examined. In particular, the large Cocibolca Lake, south of Managua was considered as a
sort of short-cut to allow ships to pass through 12 De Lesseps, decided to go the
Panamanian route, and faced very little opposition, having already successfully built the
Suez Canal. Although he failed to build a canal in Panama, the United States picked up
where he left off, and never looked back.
11
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In the mid-1990s, new calls for a canal in Nicaragua began to be heard within the
country. Many argued that a canal would help the country recover from its civil war and
boost its economy ahead of its neighbors in Central America 13 . The government is
currently looking at four options, two being an overland route using railways and the
other two being a maritime route. Overland routes would be cheaper to construct,
however, the income generated from a maritime route with its ability to transport larger
quantities of goods would be greater. It is unknown which option, if any, the government
will settle on. However, it seems as though the Nicaraguan government is leaning
towards the maritime route.
In 2004, a delegation of Russian business men visited Nicaragua to assess the
feasibility of a canal in that country 14 . The proposed canal project has been dubbed the
Grand Canal project and will utilize a link system of rivers and lakes, which will mean
less dredging and digging. Estimates suggest that companies will have to invest around
$20 billion to construct the proposed canal and that it will create 40,000 jobs in
Nicaragua 15 . It remains to be seen whether Nicaragua is willing to take on such a largescale and expensive project, but if Panama serves as a model, the positive economic
impact a canal could have in the long-run may prove to be appealing for a nation with a
troubled economy 16 .
This chapter has highlighted some key fundamental aspects of Panama’s place
within the global capitalist system. First, Panama’s key strategic location – both for
economic and military purposes – has meant that many core states have shown interest in
13
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the Central American state, but none more so than the United States. Second, Panama’s
position within the world-system as a semi-periphery state means that it is eager to
continue its relationships with the core, in hopes of breaking through into the “circle of
the elite” among states. This also has other implications. Panama, being in this position,
is desperate to avoid sliding back into the periphery. An ecological disaster; the
breakdown of the Panama Canal by outside forces (such as development-induced strain
on the watershed area or an attack by terrorist groups); a new, faster transportation route
for shipping such as the Nicaraguan option or the emerging Northwest Passage are all
possibilities that could affect Panama’s primary source of income: the Canal. How the
Canal goes, so goes Panama.
Interestingly though, Panama seems to be in a catch-22. As Panama seeks to
expand the canal, more and more development within the watershed area can be
expected. Afterall, development boomed during the 20th Century in the immediate Canal
watershed region. This development, though, puts strains on the watershed itself, as well
as creates more sources of pollution, health and safety hazards and marginalization of the
poor and indigenous.
Thus, Panama is of key importance to many states, but primarily to the United
States. The United States has had a paternal role in dealing with Panama, from the time
of Panama’s independence to the handover of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian
government on December 31, 1999. Because of Panama’s economic importance in terms
of trade and natural resources, Panama was a prime location for U.S. military interests as
well. In short, protecting Panama meant protecting the Canal and having a strong
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military presence meant a “stable” Latin America and Caribbean region would hopefully
mean a more prosperous (for the U.S.) region as well.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ECONOMIC INTERESTS VIA SECURITY
It is necessary to explore the militaristic security threats that Panama faces to help
explain the strong U.S. presence in the country. As has been noted, these threats pose a
direct threat to the Panama Canal which in turn pose a threat to U.S. economic interests
within the region. If the Canal is damaged or destroyed, or even taken out of U.S.
control, the economic impact could be huge for not only the United States, but for many
other core states.
So, what are the main threats, real or perceived? What have been the threats, real
or perceived in years past? And what have been the policy responses to these real and/or
perceived threats? This chapter will discuss all of these within a historical context.
Futher, this chapter will highlight the economic and human impact these policies have
had on the two main indigenous groups within Panama, the Kuna Yala and the Ngobe.
Currently, the main direct security threat in Panama comes from outside its
borders with the Colombian internal conflict and the ever-looming threat of it spilling
over and causing regional instability. However, securing the Panama Canal region has
been of vital concern to the United States for well over a century. This chapter presents
an overview of U.S. military involvement in Panama (and Colombia, its closest neighbor)
as well as the environmental socio-cultural consequences of such involvement.
U.S Security in a Historical Context
As was briefly touched upon in the preceding chapter, the United States has (and
has had for over a century) placed a priority on securing Panama and maintaining a
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peaceful environment. It is in the interest of the United States, as Panama – even before
the Panama Canal became operational – has been a key component to global trade.
Rebellions, insurrections and even world wars have repeatedly shifted focus in
Washington, D.C. to securing the Canal. Following the Gold Rush, there were numerous
events that called for U.S. military action or presence in Panama.
Following the Watermelon Riot in 1856 there were numerous riots and
insurrections, usually involving Caribbean Blacks against the governing power inside
Panama (Lindsay-Poland 2003, p. 15). Each time such an event occurred, the United
States military was engaged in some way, whether peace-keeping or actual combat.
Interestingly enough, with increased pressure generated by the Civil War in the
United States, President Abraham Lincoln even went as far as to develop a plan to move
emancipated Blacks to a large plot of land in Chiriquí. This coincided with a special deal
arranged by the Chiriquí Improvement Company (based in Philadelphia) to sell the U.S.
Navy coal for a discounted price. The Blacks, Lincoln envisioned would then be put to
work in the coal mines of Chiriquí and live separately from the Whites who he believed
could not coexist with Whites (Lindsay-Poland 2003, p. 15).
In 1880, President Rutherford Hayes pointed toward the future when he called for
an American-controlled canal on the isthmus. He even warned direct military opposition
to a canal owned and operated by European countries. To prepare, the U.S. Navy began
military maneuvers in the waters off the coast of what is now Panama. The statements by
Hayes, coupled with the military maneuvers, angered the Colombian government.
Panama was then under Colombian control, and the Colombians felt that they had not
been properly notified of U.S. intentions.
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In the subsequent years, many rebellions arose, pitting Panamanians against the
Colombian governing authorities in Panama. Whites who lived in the area stayed out of
the conflicts for the most part. However, more often than not, the U.S. military was
brought in to address the conflicts. The following table highlights the major
involvements of the United States military within Panama:
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Date

Table 1 Chronology of U.S. Intervention in Panama
Rationale
Date
Rationale

September 1922, 1856

“to protect American interests
during an insurrection”*

September 27 –
October 7,
1860
1861

Internal conflict

Political disturbance

November 1724, 1904

March 9-10,
1865

“To protect the lives and
property of American residents
during a revolution”

1908, 1910,
1912

“To protect passengers and
treasure in transit during the
absence of local police or
troops”
“To protect American interests
during hostilities over possession
of the government of the state of
Panama”
“To re-establish free transit
during revolutionary activity”

1918-1920

September
17-November
18, 1902
November
1903

“To place armed guards in all
trains crossing the isthmus”
Colombian military prevented
from putting down independence
movement
“To protect American lives and
property at Ancón at the time of a
threatened insurrection”
U.S. troops supervised elections
outside of the Canal Zone.

“For police duty, according to
treaty stipulations, at Chiriquí
during electoral disturbances and
subsequent unrest”
U.S. naval ships held maneuvers
May 7-22 and
April 1921
on both sides of the isthmus
September 23during a border dispute between
October 9,
Panama and Costa Rica
1873
Panama City: “Strikes and rent
March and
October 12riots led to the landing of about
April 1885
23, 1925
six hundred American troops to
keep order and protect American
interests”
“To protect American interests
Panama City and Colon: U.S.
March 8-9,
January 9,
during an attack on the town of
soldiers kill 21 and wounded 500
1895
1964
Bocas del Toro by a bandit
students who attempted to raise
chieftain”
the Panamanian flag inside the
U.S.-controlled Canal Zone
“To protect American property
November 20December 20, U.S. invades Panama with 25,000
on the isthmus and to keep
troops to protect U.S. citizens as
December 4,
1989
transit lines open during serious
well as the Canal infrastructure;
1901
revolutionary disturbances”;
also to stop drug trafficking and
with French participation
restore democracy
Bocas del Toro occupied at
U.S. troops intervene in Panama
April 16-22,
December 5,
request of United Fruit Company 1990
City quell protests by police
1902
demanding higher wages and
political reforms
*Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1962 to justify possible direct intervention in Cuba. (Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Situation in Cuba, found in Panama and the United States: The Forced
Alliance, Michael Conniff (1992).
April 1868
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World War II and Beyond
The largest buildup of U.S. forces in Panama occurred in the years preceding U.S.
involvement in WWII. The United States had recently - in 1942 – obtained concessions
by the Panamanian government to occupy 134 sites within Panama, including nine
airfields and two radar sites (Lindsay-Poland 2003, p. 45). This period also, interestingly,
marked the first time the United States Navy was able to expand its operations during war
via the Panama Canal. At its height, the U.S. military had placed 63,000 troops within
Panama (Lindsay-Poland 2003, p. 45).
The strategic importance of Panama as a gateway to the Pacific for the U.S.
military is obvious. Also, however, there were other strategic possibilities within the
countries borders. Beginning in 1943 and lasting until 1968, the United States had an
active chemical weapons testing program in Panama. The main goal, according to many
U.S. military officials, was to defend against an invasion. Major General Preston Brown
was in control of U.S. military operations in Panama during the time and he believed that
the jungle environment, with its humidity and heat, offered a great environment for what
were termed “persistent gases”. This led to a buildup of chemical weapons stockpiles in
the years before the actual testing began. And according to Lindsay-Poland (2003), “By
1940, the United States had eighty-four tons of mustard gas; ten tons of phosgene;
thousands of mustard-charged mortar rounds; and hundreds of assorted chemical
projectors, shells and cylinders on hand in the Canal Zone,” (p. 49).
During the War years, and in the years immediately following WWII, countless
tests using chemical and nerve gases were conducted. Live animals were often brought
in, specifically goats from Ecuador, to test these chemical weapons. However, as
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Lindsay-Poland points out, many military scientists felt that tests on non-human subjects
were “inadequate” and that tests on soldiers should thus be conducted (2003, p. 55).
Subsequently, Lindsay-Poland notes, that some sixty thousand solders were exposed to
“chemical agents in various sites by the end of the war,” and, “at least four thousand of
these people were subjected to high doses of mustard gas or Lewisite (an arsenic agent)
in gas chambers or in contaminated field areas,” (2003, p. 55). In addition, the U.S. used
newly enlisted Puerto Rican soldiers in is tests as well, which resulted in many of the
soldiers being hospitalized.
The tests also served to train U.S. troops in case they were themselves exposed to
chemical weapons. In one test, five tons of mustard gas was dropped via aircraft on a
platoon of U.S. soldiers wearing gas masks. These soldiers were then forced to stay in
the area of the jungle that had been sprayed for twenty four hours.
Nuclear Panama
The use of chemical weapons inside Panama continued for decades. What is
probably more troublesome is the fact that the United States government even had
nuclear ambitions there as well. Unlike other locations, the plan was not to simply test
nuclear weapons. Quite on the contrary, the plan was to excavate land for an even larger,
sea-level canal on the isthmus.

John Lindsay-Poland discusses this endeavor, named Project
Plowshare, in detail:
The plan was to set off two hundred fifty to three hundred hydrogen
bombs in the Darién Province region of Panama, near the border with
Colombia, with each explosion carrying explosive power between twenty
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and two thousand times that of the bomb in Hiroshima in order to build a
sea-level waterway without locks. The project would displace forty
thousand people, mostly Kuna Indians for whom the area was home;
shatter windows up to five hundred miles away; and possibly cause
damage to the existing canal from earth slides (2003, p. 74).

Lindsay also points out that this illustrates how Panama was a “target of opportunity for
scientists intent on completely transforming the environment to fulfill U.S. strategic aims,
largely oblivious to the cost to the tropics’ resident life,” (2003, p. 74).
Luckily for Panamanians and the natural environment, the plan met a fierce
opponent: environmentalism. The environmental movement was gaining strength during
this period – the 1960s – and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlateloco all merged almost simultaneously to
put a halt to Project Plowshare.
Formal U.S. Military Departure
With the departure of the U.S. military presence in Panama at the end of 1999,
Panama became the owner of dozens of former military installations, many of which had
weapons ranges riddle with “bombs, mortars, rockets and other dangers,” (LindsayPoland 2003, p. 139). After contentious debates between the U.S. and Panama over who
should clean it up, the end result was that the United States left over one hundred
thousand pieces of unexploded ordinance inside Panama (Lindsay-Poland 2003, p. 139).
The weaponry and explosives that remained led to many accidents. The figure below
shows the number of military installations in the immediate Canal Zone during the time
of the handover.
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Figure 6 U.S. Military Installations
Source: U.S. Military

Further, with the period of military base closures that the Pentagon
experienced in the 1990s, many situations at bases abroad led to environmental
contamination. In December 1993, Defense Secretary William Perry signed a new policy
regulating the cleanup of overseas military installations which, for all intents and
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purposes, only elevated cleanup operations to a priority if the risk to human health was
imminent and sustainable (Lindsay-Poland 2003, p. 145). John Lindsay-Poland (2003)
argues that this bias towards cleanup of overseas bases is a pattern of environmental
racism that was also witnessed within the United States, in mostly African American
communities with military installations (pp. 145-146).
Even worse, more information was uncovered as the U.S. cleared out the
remainder of its military installations in Panama regarding chemical weapons and
spraying. Chemical pesticides DDT and Chlordane were used heavily on military
installations and even residential areas in the Canal Zone, even after they had been
banned in the United States. The result of this spraying has resulted in significant human
health hazards (Lindsay-Poland 2003, p. 167). Also, water samples at Howard Air Force
Base and at the Army base at Fort Kobbe indicated high levels of petroleum distillates
(Lindsay-Poland 2003, p. 167).
In an effort to assuage fears by the poor and indigenous in Panama, the
government engaged in a reforestation project that would reforest many of the lands once
occupied by U.S. military installations. The main idea here was to make the forested and
newly reforested areas a buffer to keep people out of the explosive-laden areas of former
bases.
This project however, ultimately reeked of capitalist intentions rather than
intentions based primarily on the welfare of the environment and the country’s people.
When the project was developed, a cost-benefit analysis was employed to put a value on
a hectare of tropical forest used for “sustainable exploitation. This neoliberal economic
policy was echoed by developers who sought to make commodities of the land and its
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people. In John Lindsay-Poland’s book Emperors of the Jungle (2003), Herman Bern,
promoter of the Gamboa Tropical Rainforest Resort – situated north of Panama City near
the Canal – is quoted as saying “…we have nature as our theme park…We have several
indigenous communities. We want to interact and work very closely with them, so that
we can show their culture, their way of living…We’ll make a project that wealthy people
will want to visit,” (p. 182). The capitalist system has a way of exploiting whatever can
be exploited. Whenever a group of people (or land) is not tied directly into an economic
system through labor or direct resource exploitation – such as the case with “protected
lands” – the core-states and their capitalists find a way to make of profit nonetheless.
Narcoterrorism and Post-Cold War Panama
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War left many in
Washington to question Panama’s strategic importance. However, there was soon a new
role Panama could strategically play; fighting the drug war.
Panama was a very important center for drug trafficking, primarily cocaine
coming out of Colombia. The Canal offered great opportunities to ship cocaine – and
other narcotics – abroad. Thus, fighting this dilemma was of prime importance. More
so, however, was the increasing hostilities within Colombia their propensity to spill over
into neighboring Panama. The paramilitary groups, primarily the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), are of most concern to the governments of both Colombia
and the United States. Colombia’s place in the region – and with respect to Panama
specifically – cannot be overstated. Colombia’s internal struggles pose direct security
threats to Panama, and in turn, the Panama Canal. Protecting Panama’s borders means
protecting Panama’s vital assets, the first of which is the Canal. Thus, a secure Colombia
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equates to a more secure region. A more secure region benefits Panama directly as
expansion plans can more easily proceed, foreign investment is not scared away and
instead, returns more fervently, and new partnerships with regional and global players
can be made.
Background and History of the FARC
Today, the FARC is the most powerful and successful guerilla army in the world,
fielding approximately 18,000 fighters, of which most are peasants. 17 To better
understand the FARC of today and the conflict overall, however, it is essential to know
where the FARC comes from. The FARC traces its origins back to the 1950s and a
period of intense civil war – la violencia - within Colombia. La violencia was a bloody
internal war that left 200,000 dead. 18 Throughout the first half of the 20th Century, there
had been much strife, both politically and militarily, between liberals and conservatives.
La Violencia represented the final phase of open warfare between the Liberals and the
Conservatives, and occurred between 1946 and 1958. 19 This period had witnessed a new
rift forming within Colombia, as well as throughout all of Latin America: the political
split between left and right. Many throughout Latin America began finding much interest
in Marxist philosophy, rooted in the Hegelian dialectic. This was also true within
Colombia. However, Colombia differed from other Latin American states in that lacked
any central power; Colombia at this time could be characterized by its continued
dispersion and fragmentation of power throughout the country, a premodern attribute, and
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in some ways is still present today. 20 Grace Livingstone makes this point clearly when
she says:
The Colombian State has never had control over all its territory. Since
independence there have been local armies, guerrillas, bandits, armed
peasants and landowners controlling parts of the country. 21

Being that there was no “nation-state” in the sense that we now think of,
Colombia of this period was marked by many feuding clans of groups vying for power,
most notably within the political left. By the mid-1940s, a prominent and outspoken
figure for the left began to emerge within Colombia. Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was
vehemently outspoken and criticized the maldistribution of wealth in the country as well
as the concentration of political power in the hands of a miniscule oligarchy. 22 However,
Gaitán was not a self-proclaimed communist. With three-quarters of the population
being peasants, and with only 3 percent of landowners controlling over half of the
agricultural land 23 , it is not too difficult to understand why Gaitán was becoming such a
popular figure within Colombia. Gaitán’s message was taken to heart by many within
Colombia, and as a result violence dramatically increased throughout the countryside and
within principle cities.
Gaitán’s message, while not technically communist, presented a threat to those in
power within Colombia as well as to the United States. This period coincides directly
with the early stages of the Cold War. Within the context of this global proxy-war
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the rising Marxist rhetoric coming out of
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Colombia was sure to alarm officials in Washington. On April 9, 1948 Gaitán was
assassinated. Many throughout the country believed that the CIA had supported the
operation, and many still do today. However, the CIA denies any involvement. Whether
the CIA was involved or not, the end result was devastating. Mass riots broke out within
the capital city of Bogotá, the most powerful mass organization ever in Colombian
history. 24 This period of instant violence and rioting is known as Bogotazo and was
marked by lootings of government buildings, offices, shops, and mansions. However, the
violence did not stop there. After the rioting was quelled by the military, violence
continued in the countryside as peasants and liberals continued to revolt where they
could. Suppression was the method employed by the army and police to keep the
uprisings down. Villages were burnt, women were raped, and people were killed in many
horrific ways. As Livingstone puts it, “Each act of violence sowed the seeds for a
reprisal”. 25 When all was said and done, after a decade of bloodiness and devastation,
the social revolt was successfully defeated and the country continued to be dominated by
large landowners.
During this period of violence, many people banded together to form guerilla
groups with hopes of successfully fighting back against the powerful army and police
forces in Colombia. Throughout the subsequent years, these politically motivated rebel
groups formed communities in the countryside, recruiting peasants to their cause.
Eventually, these communities became self-sufficient farming communities. However, in
1964 the Colombian government launched a military offensive against one particular
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community, Marquetalia, and the rebels were forced to flee.26 This did not stop the
cohesiveness of the guerrillas, however, as meetings continued to be held and in 1966 the
FARC was officially formed by Manuel Marulanda Vélez.

Expansion of the FARC
Following its formation, the main goal of the FARC was survival. Nowhere near
its size and strength of today, the FARC of the 1960s and 1970s was tasked with
maintaining cohesion, recruitment, and defensive operations for the most part. When the
FARC did operate offensively, it often did so with infrequent and rapid guerrilla attacks
on military encampments as well as raids on farms. The goal of these offensive
operations was mainly to aid its survival by capturing military equipment as well as
securing food and supplies. 27 However, the FARC also kidnapped hostages for ransom –
a trend we still see today, which will be discussed in further detail later – and settled
scores with government and military informants.
The FARC claimed to be a politically motivated military operation. An
interesting move to give the cause more credibility with this title came in the late 1960s.
During this time, the FARC began to “look” like an army, with uniforms and even an
insignia being worn by its “soldiers”. These formative years were witness to a slow
expansion of the FARC, but nonetheless significant and extremely meaningful.
The very early stages of the FARC, the formative years, typically saw the FARC
operating in areas they had always historically been in. Facing a determined army with
26
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far superior numbers and weapons whose goal was crushing their movement dictated that
the FARC could not successfully branch out into other territories. This changed,
however, during much of the 1970s. As early as 1969, the FARC had opened up a
second “front” in central Colombia. In 1971, a third front was created in the Urabá area,
in the Darien gap between Panama and Colombia. 28 Many of the FARC’s early activities
of small raids, recruitment, and propaganda were paying off as its membership began to
increase, even if it was ever so slowly.
Organizationally, the FARC was also evolving and growing. In 1974, the
organization established a general staff and a secretariat to provide political direction. 29
Expansion continued in the early 1980s as a new expansion strategy was being
implemented. This new strategy called for the creation of many new fronts.
Furthermore, each new front would be tasked with gaining enough strength to create
another front.
Perhaps a brief definition of a front is necessary. For this definition, I will turn to
a very well-rounded, detailed one provided by Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk in their
book Colombian Labyrinth:
A front is not a military unit of any particular size; it refers to a guerrilla
command operating in a geographic jurisdiction. Within the front
jurisdiction there are combat, support, and infrastructure elements.
Usually the core of the front is the combat units, generally one or several
companies. A company consists of some 50-55 fighters, divided into two
platoons called guerrillas, each consisting of approximately 25 fighters.
Besides combat units there are commissions, staffed by militia members.
The finance commission is in charge of collecting “taxes.” In addition,
there are logistics commissions, intelligence commissions, public order
commissions, mass work commissions, and others as may be designated
by the front commander. 30
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This should clear up any confusion about what exactly a front is. It should not be
confused with a military front in the sense of a large-scale war such as World War II and
Germany’s Russian “front”.

The 1980s and the Drug Trade
Primarily due to a lack of financial ability to acquire weapons and fund its
operations, the growth of the FARC was slow during the 1960s and 1970s. Remember,
the main goal during this period was survival against the Colombian forces. The 1980s
saw a drastic change in the way the FARC conducted its operations as well as a rapid
increase in size and strength. The primary reason for this surge in power and ability was
due to the illicit drug trade. In 1982, a decision was taken by the Seventh Conference of
the FARC to develop links with the Colombian drug industry that would provide the
money - and manpower - necessary for the creation of a “true” democracy. 31 By
occupying many coca-growing regions of Colombia, the FARC were able to establish ties
with the cocaine industry, which was experiencing a large boom in demand throughout
the world and especially within the United States. With its capabilities and its influence,
the FARC began to take control of every aspect of the narcotics trade within Colombia.
The FARC established themselves early on as security forces for the drug-traffickers in
Colombia. Components of the FARC essentially provided law, order, and protection to
populations and regions involved in coca cultivation, chemical processing of raw coca
into cocaine, as well as distribution.
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traffickers, they have been known to require fees or “taxes” for their efforts. The FARC
is alleged to have charged as high as a 10 percent tax on the aspects of the industry in
which it was involved. 33
The FARC began to experience trouble, however, during the 1980s. The huge
narco-kingpins, such as Pablo Escobar, began to create their own security forces, rather
than pay the FARC for their services. One main reason for this was ideology. These
kingpins were known for being extremely capitalistic, which clashed with the leftistMarxist ideals the FARC held. Being that one of the FARC’s main goals was land
reform, kingpins with large estates were very wary of the FARC and their operations.
Thus the paramilitaries, created in the mid-1980s partially at the behest of narcokingpins, have largely served the security functions previously performed by the
FARC. 34 Still, the FARC maintain close ties with the narcotics industry in Colombia.
Since the 1980s, the FARC has relied on the coca-cultivation of many peasants in the
south of the country, where they still tax almost every aspect of the industry. According
to the BBC, now they tax every stage of the drug business, from the chemicals needed to
process the hardy coca bush into cocaine and the opium poppy into heroin, right up to
charging for the processed drugs to be flown from illegal airstrips they control. 35
By immersing itself in the booming cocaine industry, the FARC created a viable
means of increasing cash to fund its operations and strengthen its forces. Estimates
abound, but the general consensus figure for the FARC’s yearly revenue from narcotrafficking is $300 million. The importance of narco-trafficking in strengthening the
ability of the FARC in both weaponry and size is explained well by Max G. Manwaring:
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As a result, FARC expanded from approximately 2,000 guerrilla fighters
in 1982 to over 70 fronts (company-sized units) with 18,000-20,000
fighters in 2001. This illicit funding has provided the FARC with the
capability of confronting regular Colombian military units up to battalion
size, and of overrunning police and military installations and smaller units.
Moreover, insurgent presence has spread from 173 municipalities in 1985
to 622 in 1995, out of a total of approximately 1,050. 36
Today, an estimated 50-60 percent of all FARC fronts’ financing originates in drugrelated activities and a recent raid unearthed evidence confirming the involvement of the
FARC in almost aspect of the international drug trade. 37 Perhaps this is one of the
reasons why the FARC (and other such groups in Colombia) have grown militarily while
other rebel groups throughout Latin America were not and have been forced to negotiate
or have been annihilated.
Flirting with a Political Front
The 1980s saw more than just the FARC incorporating the drug-trade into its
financial base. This also was the time when the FARC flirted with a political front to
reach its goals. In the mid-1980s, the Colombian government approached all of
Colombia’s guerrilla groups, including the FARC, with a plan for peace. This plan
included granting amnesty for guerrilla fighters and also had a ceasefire component.
Throughout the so-called peace process, the FARC was still outspoken against the
Colombian government. The FARC claimed that the negotiations and actions of the
Colombian government did nothing to reverse the socioeconomic trends that were
occurring in Colombia. The FARC continued to insist for land reform, redistribution of
wealth, and other reforms.
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Despite the criticism that the FARC so often expressed of the Colombian
government, in 1985 the FARC created a new leftist political party, the Union Patriótica
(UP). This was the first time, in all of its history that the FARC had seriously attempted
to take the political route power. The members of the UP consisted mainly of those
guerrillas who accepted the amnesty promised by the Colombian government. In its first
congressional election in 1986, the UP won a surprising 14 seats. This joy and success,
however, were short-lived. Members of the UP who participated in Colombian politics
became easy targets for the right-wing paramilitary death squads that were tasked with
crushing the FARC and other leftist guerrilla groups. Reportedly, some of these death
squads had ties to the Colombian government. During the late 1980s and early 1990s,
between 2,000 and 4,000 UP leaders and supporters were assassinated by right-wing
paramilitary forces that the FARC claimed were often aligned with the government. 38
With the UP now decimated, the only legitimate political route for the FARC was closed.
The FARC then decided that there was no hope for a political route to power. Thus, the
FARC focused on the military route, which they still employ today.
Other Activities Employed by the FARC
There are many tactics the FARC engages in as means to reach its ultimate goal of the
eradication of the state. Most consider the non-military tactics to be acts of terrorism,
thus the label of the FARC as a terrorism group. 39 The following section outlines in
detail the various actions employed by the FARC.
Military
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If the FARC were merely narco-traffickers, they would not gain the notoriety that
they currently have within Colombia, nor would they alarm officials within the United
States either. The FARC is a highly organized rebel group. Some might call the FARC a
venerable army of highly trained fighters. With its increasing cash flow, the FARC has
been able to increase its military capabilities drastically. The rebels have been able to
increase their military capabilities in four main areas. First, the FARC has been able to
improve its command and control capabilities to the point where they now can coordinate
with multiple units on the ground. This makes for strategic attacks that are much more
efficient and effective. Second, they have been able to purchase much more advanced
communications equipment that allows for better placement and movement of forces
throughout the country. Third, they have begun to create special forces units designed to
carry out specific missions, such as assaults and demolitions. Finally, the guerrillas have
had the financial capacity to purchase heavy weaponry that drastically levels the playing
field. Roman D. Ortiz, in his essay Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia explains the extent to which the FARC
have gone to employ heavy weaponry:
The Colombian guerrilla forces employed in their operations a level of
heavy weapons support almost unheard of among the revolutionary
movements in the continent in terms of quantity and quality. This material
included mortars, rocket launchers, and heavy machine guns. Moreover,
although they were not used in combat, it became Colombian
Revolutionary Armed Forces known that they had at their disposal a
certain amount of portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) as well as some
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft for use in logistical support tasks. 40
The 1990s saw large increases in FARC activity. The weaponry that the FARC
was – and currently is - able to employ in combat makes them a serious threat to the
40
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Colombian army as well as others. To reach its goal of overthrowing the government, the
FARC must chip away at that governmental control. The most efficient way of
accomplishing this, a way with a higher likelihood of success, is to isolate certain areas,
drive out police, military, and government officials, and then establish control. This is
exactly the type of strategy the FARC typically employs. During the 1990s, the FARC
focused on the capital, Bogotá, with hopes of isolating that city by gaining control of
surrounding areas. The FARC also created urban militias – a new component to the
FARC’s military strategy – which multiplied the strength of the fronts themselves. Just
how far FARC had progressed was brought home in late February 1998 when the
understrength 52nd Counter-guerrilla Battalion (52 BCG) of the newly formed 3rd
Mobile Brigade (3 BRIM), deploying only 154 men in three of its companies, was lured
into a prepared ambush and decimated at El Billar, Caqueta. 41 The FARC has also been
known to plant bombs, conduct mortar attacks on government buildings, and assassinate
key figures in cities and towns throughout Colombia. These military tactics have proven
to be successful – although not always – for the FARC, if for nothing else than
demonstrating their highly organized nature and ability to conduct complicated yet
successful military operations.
Kidnapping and Extortion
In order for the FARC to become one of the most powerful rebel groups in the
world, it must supplement its finances by means other than the global drug trade. It has
been established that the FARC (reportedly) draws in over $300 million a year through
the drug industry. However, a growing military (whether it is legitimate or rebel) will
41
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continuously need more money. The FARC recognized this long ago and therefore has
had kidnappings (for ransom) and extortion in practice for some time. The strategy of the
FARC is to kidnap individuals suspected of having two main criteria: 1) some sort of
relationship to an important government official or 2) some degree of wealth; a
combination of both would be the most beneficial to the FARC. Therefore, in many
respects, the FARC does not discriminate. Tourists have been kidnapped. Relatives of
wealthy landowners are also targeted. Government officials, if not killed outright, are
held for ransom, as well as their relatives. Colombia, a country rife with violence and
conflict, where guerrilla groups such as the FARC are a constant threat (as are the
paramilitaries), is home to over 3,000 kidnappings a year, with a large portion of that
total belonging to the FARC. 42
The Kidnappings do not occur only within the Colombian borders, however. The
countries that share borders with Colombia are also affected. Panama, Ecuador and Peru
have all had citizens from within their borders kidnapped and held for ransom. The
problem, as I shall demonstrate later, is not confined to Colombia. It has widespread
implications for the entire region. No one should be fooled into thinking otherwise.
Extortion, while not as “sexy” as kidnapping does occur and is used often by the
FARC to increase their money supply. This is common throughout Colombia, as FARC
soldiers often extort money from people who are wealthy and typically own lots of land.
The FARC will also strong-arm these individuals into handing over large sums of money
in exchange for protection of their businesses and their lives. One estimate has the FARC
bringing in over $160 million from extortion and ransoms. 43 These activities, coupled
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with the highly lucrative narco-trafficking industry have helped fund the FARC’s
activities and allowed it to become one of the most well organized and armed rebel
groups in the world.
With the internal conflict continuing with no end in site inside Colombia, others
in the region have obvious cause for concern. Colombia’s neighbors that share border
with the distressed state have worries of a spillover of the conflict into their territories.
These worries are largely justifiable as FARC incursions have already occurred, and have
been occurring for some time. This section will focus on one important country in the
region, Panama. Panama is a key ally in the region to the United States, and thus an
important place to look when discussing security dilemmas.
Panama, although very tiny, is highly valuable to the United States and the entire
world. The Panama Canal is one of the most important hubs for commerce and trade in
the global capitalist world-system. It is also the country’s main source of income
(generally from taxes placed on ships passing through the Canal). Once a part of
Colombia, Panama is very vulnerable to any conflict in neighboring states. A periphery
state of this importance cannot crumble from within or from outside forces. Thus,
Panama continues to remain an important security and economic concern for the United
States.
On December 31, 1999 the United States handed over control and sovereignty of
the Panama Canal to Panama. While this event was applauded by some and assailed by
others, the fact of the matter was, Panama was finally completely independent from
outside powers. Security of the Panama Canal was now in the hands of Panamanian
security forces, not the United States Defense Department. Not surprisingly, the
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withdrawal of the last U.S. military units at the end of 1999 gave this nation a
responsibility for which it had neither experience nor adequate forces. 44
As with other neighboring countries, the FARC has routinely ventured into
Panama seeking rest, recuperation, even recreation. The Darien Province is the province
in eastern Panama, bordering Colombia and is characterized by rugged terrain and
tropical rainforest. This is an ideal area to hideout and escape Colombian forces, mostly
in the form of paramilitaries. However, not surprisingly, the paramilitaries are not shy
about following the FARC into Panamanian territory. In 1997 reports surfaced that
paramilitary commanders were offering $2,000 for each guerrilla killed in Panama. 45
For both the United States and Panama, the FARC present a variety of problems.
First, there is the fear of scaring off foreign investors. If the core countries of the
capitalist world-system see Panama as being an insecure country that allows rebels (now
considered terrorists) to flow unabated through its territories, then investors will be
reluctant to spend millions of dollars on projects that could potentially become prime
targets or collateral damage in a cross-border conflict.
For this reason, it took quite some time before the Panamanian government would
acknowledge any presence of the FARC within its territory. Furthermore, Panamanian
security forces have often been held back far from the Darien region and been ordered to
avoid contact with armed Colombian forces, whether they be guerrillas or paramilitaries.
Given the superiority of the Colombians, whether guerrillas or paramilitaries, in combat
skills and equipment, this strategy was not altogether unreasonable. 46
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Second, the FARC have brought their kidnapping activities into Panama. Locals
suspected of having wealth or tourists are targeted. Violence has reached the point that
many locals are extremely fearful. The Bishop of Darien, Romulo Emiliani, declared that
“armed groups have transformed our peaceful province. Now kidnapping and assault
have become as common here as in Colombia.” 47
Third, the conflict has spilled over enough to cause physical destruction in
villages of Darien. Much of this destruction is caused by the Colombian paramilitaries
chasing the fleeing FARC or destroying areas suspected of housing FARC supplies and
soldiers. For many local Panamanians, the Colombian paramilitaries are just as bad, if
not worse than the FARC rebels. In June 1999, Interior Minister Mariela Sagel said that,
while border crossings had been going on for 25 years, paramilitaries now “have
threatened the Panamanian townspeople with death if they continue selling supplies to the
rebels. The peaceful coexistence has ended.” 48
The fourth problem is concerning refugees from Colombia. The border with
Panama has, in recent years, seen drastic increases in fierce fighting between FARC
rebels and Colombian paramilitaries. Dr. Richard Millett explains how recent fighting
has caused the refugee problem:
In December 1999, heavy fighting near the border caused over 300
refugees to pour into the Darien, further exacerbating the region’s
problems. By March 2000 the number had reached 500, and Panama
began urging Colombia to accept their repatriation. 49

47

Millett, p. 19
Millett, p. 19
49
Millett, p. 19
48

71

Panama cannot afford to deal with a refugee crisis. With no security forces that amount
to anything, Panama is having enough trouble trying to deal with the insurgent problem.
Refugees would only compound difficulties for the Panamanian government.
Future Prospects
The situation in eastern Panama is anything about stable. The border remains
permeable, with border crossings occurring regularly by FARC rebels and paramilitaries.
Two scenarios are possible in Panama. One, the Colombian government can continue to
combat the FARC with little success, and hope they fade away. They can hope that Plan
Colombia will indeed work and that the FARC will figuratively starve to death. This is
the best scenario for Panamanians. However, that possibility is not likely given the
fledgling nature of Plan Colombia.
The second scenario is much less comforting. If the Colombian government does
decide to fiercely crackdown on the FARC – whether or not this effort is substantially
supported by the United States - the result could be catastrophic for its neighbors,
particularly Panama. Should this occur, we might see the often mentioned “balloon
effect” result. FARC forces facing insurmountable odds and mounting losses might flee
Colombia. If they flee into Panama, the Panamanian government will have little in its
arsenal to stop their incursion. Of all the bordering nations, Panama is the most
vulnerable, having neither regular armed forces nor direct land connections with the
border region, a long history of the usage of Panamanian territory by Colombian narcotraffickers, and a lack of any real capacity to control its land, sea, or air frontiers. 50 With
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these characteristics, any large-scale FARC migration to Panama could potentially be
devastating.
The Panamanian government is stuck between a rock and a hard place. They
have no military. Their Public Forces (PF) has no heavy weapons, poor communications
and poorly trained leadership, rendering them highly ineffective against forces of any
substantial size and strength. If it were the case, the FARC and paramilitaries could
destroy villages in Darien and spread westward, leaving destruction in their wake with
little to no resistance. However, any lack of action is looked down upon by the United
States, especially after September 11th. Panama risks straining relations with the United
States by not acting and potentially hurting itself economically. The best way the
Panamanians can handle this situation is by sending whatever forces it has to the Darien,
and hope the situation does not deteriorate.
Panama is very reluctant to ask for U.S. assistance because it is still only recently
under its own control completely. Many within Panama are not ready – and may never
be ready – for a return of U.S. military forces to Panamanian soil. This might be their
only option however. If the FARC and paramilitaries bring the fighting to Panamanian
territory in any large-scale capacity, the Panamanian government will be left with no
options but to appeal to the United States. The United States would most likely be
willing to assist. Depending on what is going on throughout the world at the time, the
United States would love to regain control of Panama Canal security. It would benefit its
influence in the region as well as aid in the global war on terror, as the canal is a major
hub for narcotics trade that fund terror groups all across the globe. Also, terror groups
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might wish to attack the Canal. The U.S. with its resources would be much more
effective at attack prevention than the Panamanians.
All of these scenarios may sound depressing to many Panamanians. However,
Panama cannot afford to lose its primary source of income in the Canal. With plans at
expanding the Canal, Panama is looking at developing and increasing its economy. An
attack by the FARC, or any other terror group for that matter, would be devastating to the
tiny state. With no other major global exports, Panama’s development would stifle.
Panama cannot afford to become, once again, a banana republic. A return to assistance
from the United States might be an inevitable reality for Panama if it wishes to develop at
all in a region full of conflict and violence. The future is uncertain. What is certain is
that this region will continue to be extremely important in the coming years as fighting
continues and peace seems further and further away. The coming years will be
significant in determining what the outcome will be for Colombia, the FARC, and
Panama.
Indigenous People in Panama
The current discussion has centered on how the priorities of security and
economic prosperity (via the accumulation of wealth, i.e. capital) have placed a burden
on the natural environment and people of Panama. But what must be discussed to some
degree of great detail is the impact felt by the indigenous group within Panama, as has
been said before, the poorest people in the poorest states often feel the effects first and
harshest – and indigenous are often on the margins of society (Wickstrom 2003).
Specifically within Panama two main indigenous groups are found, the Kunas and
the Ngobe. These indigenous groups, like others throughout Latin America – and many
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parts of the so-called developing world – face increasing challenges brought on by
globalization and pressures of the capitalist world-system. The main reason for this in
Panama, as with other states, is the need to constantly increase the coffers. Periphery
states like Panama seek to make headway into the semiperiphery and core. Thus, as
Stefanie Wickstrom notes, “Ecological conservation and development programs that
might help rural communities meet their own changing needs have not been lasting
priorities of national development in Panama,” (2003, p. 44). Instead, the elite in Panama
choose to cooperate with foreign governments and multinational corporations that prop
up the Panamanian state in return for the assistance by the Panamanian government with
international development schemes which highlights the fact that the capitalist worldsystem has failed to address the needs of Panama’s poor majority. (Wickstrom 2003, p.
44). The following map shows the distribution of ethnicities throughout Panama. Notice
the areas that are orange and indicated “Tribal Indian” territories on the northeastern
Atlantic Coast (Kuna) and in the Western mountainous areas (Ngobe).

75

Figure 7 Map of Ethnic Groups
Source: University of Texas Online Library

As is the case with other places throughout the developing world, in Panama, the
government attempted to force indigenous populations to assimilate into the “civilized
world” in ways such as the transfer of indigenous lands to non-indigenous land buyers,
especially internal and external corporations who would then use the land for agricultural
purposes (Guionneau-Sinclair 1991; Howe 1998). The Panamanian government, through
continual legislative approval, has the right to govern indigenous lands.
Despite some gains made by indigenous groups within Panama under President
Omar Torrijos in the 1970s, there are still some critical fissures in indigenous rights, such
as the right the government can reserve to exploit natural resources on indigenous lands.
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Thus, large-scale development patterns can continue on indigenous lands. Elton (1997)
notes that seventy-five percent of the mining concessions in Panama are on indigenous
lands.
The Kuna in Panama occupy an area in northeastern Panama, on the
Atlantic/Caribbean coast called Kuna Yala. The Kuna have had more direct contact with
outside peoples over the century than any other indigenous group within Panama, and
through their associational networking, have maintained a large degree of their social and
cultural traditions, specifically with regard to traditional socio-cultural institutions. As
outsiders continued to try and occupy their land, Kuna organization and communication
throughout Panama grew stronger as a cooperative mindset among differing tribes was
necessary to sustain farming, hunting and gathering and to hold out against these outside
forces attempting to settle (Wickstrom 2003, p. 47). Thus, over the years, extensive
development has not taken place on Kuna lands. Regardless, the natural resources within
their territories are becoming degraded, such as sea turtle populations, and outside
developers are constantly seeking political routes in Panama City to have access to
resources such as timber and mineral deposits in Kuna lands (Wickstrom 2003, p. 48).
As this continues, and as their resources are continually degraded, Kuna are forced
inland, where and emerging tourism industry is allowing them to sell Kuna crafts. Thus,
Kuna traditional culture is now being sold in the global economy, but the price to the
Kuna themselves may be more than the income they are gaining in monetary terms.
The Ngobe are a similar case. Although not as politically organized as the Kuna,
they have been able to successfully organize modern political systems. Forced in the
mountainous territories of inland Panama by European settlers, the Ngobe dispersed and
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formed smaller localized groups of Ngobe throughout the region. Communication and
decision-making were done at this level, with little to no communication with other
Ngobe groups in the greater area. This could potentially be why external attempts to
control Ngobe affairs overall have been to some degree unsuccessful. For over 300
years, this political culture has meant that the Ngobe have lived together (relatively) and
cooperate without being subject to conquest (Wickstrom 2003, p. 49).
However, by the mid-twentieth century, industrial external forces started to
change things. Developers seek natural resources had begun to make their way into
Ngobe lands. Thus, the ecological systems they had helped sustain for centuries were
beginning to be lost and many of their cultural traditions were also succumbing to these
external forces. To make matters worse for the Ngobe, some Panamanian companies
have expressed interest in the possibility of harnessing hydroelectric power in Ngobe
lands via the Tabasará River, which could potentially inundate large sections of Ngobe
land (Wickstrom 2003, p. 51).
For the Kuna and the Ngobe – as well as other groups in other periphery states –
protecting ecological lands and natural resources as well as maintaining cultural
traditions and identities has proven difficult. As Stefanie Wickstrom notes:
The experiences of the Kunas and the Ngobe suggest that some cultural
survival and control over homelands may be secured by resisting external
control of lands and resource management but that integration with the
dominant Panamanian society and the world capitalist system can
undermine cultural survival and ecologically sustainable productive
activities. Poverty in indigenous communities and environmental
degradation in rural Panama are both attributable in large part to the
imposition of politico-economic institutions, practices and priorities that
have undermined the capacities of indigenous peoples and peasants to
meet their needs in ecologically sustainable ways (2003, p. 61 emphasis
added).
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The world capitalist system does not prioritize on anything other than capital
accumulation, fed to the core states in a seemingly endless cycle of exploiting not only
people but the natural landscape of the periphery states. To seriously expect the states of
the first world to place a serious emphasis on ecological and cultural protection is a
mistake. It is also a mistake to expect states in the periphery, eager to make headway into
towards the core to do so either, especially when the first to feel the shock of natural
resource degradation are the indigenous groups which often posses little to no political
power at the national level.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The discussion thus far has shown that the world-system – driven by the
machinery of capitalism – is not concerned with environmental protection in periphery
states, nor is it concerned with the lives of the poor within those states. The poor, who
are often indigenous and on the margins of society, face the consequences of
globalization in the capitalist system via environmental degradation and natural resource
depletion. Further, the risk to human health in periphery states is also at risk because of
the processes of capitalism, which focuses primarily on economic development.
Development by foreign companies – and even elites within periphery states – equates to
a loss of culture as well as exploitation of the natural environment.
The case of Panama has been highlighted in this paper and its relationship,
primarily with the United States, serves as a window into how the machine of capitalism
works through the lens of world-systems analysis. The core-states – in this case the
United States – exploits the periphery-states (Panama). Through military intervention
and occupation – as well as construction and maintenance of the main source of income
(the Panama Canal) – the United States created a pseudo-colony in Panama. Encouraging
Panamanian independence from Colombia in the 19th Century allowed the United States
to further fulfill its dreams of Manifest Destiny. With Panama, the United States, for all
intents and purposes, controlled one of the most important pieces of property and
infrastructure to the global economy. Further, the installation, over time, of multiple
military sites allowed for the strengthening of U.S. military forces in the Latin American
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region of the Western Hemisphere, putting the U.S. in a position of strategic, military
superiority during and after World War II.
The importance of the relationship between the United States and Panama cannot
be emphasized enough. Countless scholars have stressed this point and for many
different reasons. The Panama Canal is the basis for all that goes on within Panama.
Currently, we see renewed interest in this state as the Panamanian government gets
underway with its expansion project. For a time, talk of a new Nicaraguan route – and
perhaps the Northwest Passage – diverted attention of the global core from Panama. The
recent instability in the country with riots over social security reform and the worry
among many in the global trade industry that the people of Panama would vote against
the referendum for expansion certainly did not help matters.
However, the people have since voted for expansion 51 , and even though talks
continue on the Nicaraguan route 52 , the expansion of this waterway is crucial for the
Panamanian – and global – economy. Panama sits poised to reclaim its vital role; a role it
was beginning to lose a grasp on. For Panama, seeking to make its headway in the global
core, this is extremely important. Living up to its nickname as the “Hub of the
Americas” seems more possible now that passage of the referendum on expansion has
been made; the return to a banana republic seems less likely.
However, and this cannot be stressed enough, the majority of Panamanians are
poor and will face increasing pressure as development encroaches on currently
undeveloped land which is vital to so many with in Panama. The poor and indigenous
have been somewhat successful at holding out against foreign developers, but with a
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Panamanian government riddled with corruption in the past and focused on increasing its
global position (and position within Latin America), one must question how long these
groups can hold out. Wickstrom (2003) already makes this point when she discusses the
degree to which the Kuna and Ngobe have already given up some of their cultural
traditions. It seems that it is only a matter of time before the capitalist world-system will
dictate that these groups will become more and more assimilated into “civilized” society
and that the environment and human health will take a back seat to the accumulation of
wealth, funneled back to the core.
This paper has also argued that scholars are missing the point. That is, focusing
on the definitional and theoretical linkages between national security and environmental
security – and even human security – obfuscates the real problem at hand. It does not
matter if these two concepts can be theoretically linked. If these ideas do not reach the
elites in the political and global commerce spheres, it makes no difference. Further, there
is little evidence to show that even if these ideas did make it to the elite level anything
would be done.
Scholarly work done by people such as Thomas Homer-Dixon is useful, however,
as it highlights the growing concern among the “first world” of violence and conflict that
can break out due to environmental and resource degradation. Violent conflict is never
wanted.
However, it almost seems that, inevitably, these discussions turn to how violent
conflict leads to regional instability, which in turn leads to an economic security threat to
foreign investors and economies back in the core. Rather than expressing genuine
concern for lives lost and environmental destruction, the core resorts to expressing
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concern over falling markets and the “bottom line”. Afterall, if core-states did possess a
moral imperative, much like that expressed by Robert McNamara and James Blight in
their seminal work Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing and
Catastrophe in the 21st Century, then these states would be obliged to take action, expend
resources and potentially lose lives fighting for the poor, weak and marginalized in states
thousands of miles away (or even on our borders). And where would be the profit in
that?
On the contrary, only when severe economic loss or gain will the states of the
core take military action to stop genocide or killing. Usually, the core wraps itself in the
mantra of helping the weak, when, in reality, access to an oil pipeline is of more
importance.
Further, as Nicholas Hildyard (1999) points out, even these outbreaks of conflict
are often misunderstood by policy makers and scholars. Often, it is much easier to
attribute conflict in periphery states to something that is the result of population pressures
(which stress natural resources) or to some long-standing animosity between tribal groups
rather than look at what really is going on. Hildyard argues that closer inspection of
situations, more often than not, reveals that a “complex web of politics, economics,
history, psychology and a struggle for identity” produces these animosities and that often
the simple claims made are done so by the elite with self-interested agendas - agendas
that often involve the accumulation of wealth at the expense of the lives poor – (1999, p.
4).
Thus, there must be a shift in the scholarly community, specifically IR, so that
these seemingly irresolvable theoretical and definitional debates can be replaced by
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substantive, critical analysis of the world-system in which we all live and are ultimately
deeply invested in. Currently, scholars are not seeing the forest for the trees, and soon,
there will be no forest to see.
Some possible criticisms of the arguments laid forth in this paper are those often
raised by scholars such as Ulrich Beck (1992, 1999). For Beck, the world is entering into
what he terms a “world risk society” where public discourse becomes open and more
transnational. Diverging from the analysis laid forth in this paper, the elites cannot
escape the ills of development and industry (pollution, global climate changes, “risk”
etc.). Therefore, these elites, along with their poorer brethren must unite. Thus, the
battle against environmental and health hazards will be waged by newly formed
cohesions of civic groups and organizations lead by an assortment of elites and poor,
unities that cross state borders and cultural and ethnic lines. As Beck states, “David plus
Goliath” (1999, p. 41).
These ideas differ largely from class-based analyses like traditional Marxism and
the World-Systems approach employed in this paper. For Beck, this new global
endangerment is replacing the class system and its potential position as an organizing for
dismantling the capitalist system. Beck sees that all groups, workers, business owners
and the rich are all affected. Thus, to Beck, over time, the divisions of class within
society become increasingly blurred and eventually disappear because in the end,
everyone sits on the same “playing field” due to exposure to environmental risks. This
theoretical vantage point lessens the role states play within the global system and
emphasizes individuals and groups instead. While recognizing the a class-based global
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society exists, Beck is confident that this is temporary, but instead of a classless society
as Marx or even Wallerstein might envision, Beck argues for the “risk society”.
But, as Elaine Draper points out, to conclude from this that class society is being
fundamentally replaced seems a bit of a stretch (1993, p. 642). As she notes,
Toxic waste dumps are seldom found beneath the green estates of the
wealthy. Environmental hazards present the greatest threat to the poor and
racial minorities (Farley and Allen 1987; Draper 1991). Dangerous goods
find more willing buyers within less developed countries and
impoverished communities. And while it is true that the makers of
defective autos also die in car accidents, they do so less often because they
are much more likely to drive safer cars. In general, the costs of hazards
are externalized and paid by the public rather than fully absorbed by
business (1993, p. 642).
Certainly it is true that certain environmental risks are truly global or transnational in
nature. Global climate change, fishery depletion, water pollution are all examples of such
transnational risks. However, to conclude that all environmental and health risks become
so large as to burden every member of the world system, indiscriminant of position
within that system so as to render the system useless seems overblown. Indeed there will
be newly formed alliances between different groups; perhaps even once competing
groups. But it is highly more probably the companies will cooperate with companies and
NGOs will cooperate with NGOs that share similar interests. Even if more substantional
and robust alliances are forged, as Beck predicts, there is another fundamental flaw with
this analysis, which is discussed below.
What Beck’s argument – and many like it – fail to adequately argue is exactly
how these newly formed alliances will result in a new political structure sufficient enough
to tackle the inarguably transnational problems the world faces. In other words, what is
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to say that these newly formed cohesive “forces” will not end up just formulating ad hoc
responses to environmental and health challenges? As Harriet Bulkeley notes:
The argument that risk society heralds a new political dynamic, in which a
division emerges between an impotent formal political system and various
subpolitical arenas, is difficult to sustain…Beck's thesis does not
adequately capture the political dynamics of contemporary risk issues
(2001, pp 442-443).
For Beck – and many others – globalization as a force “implies the weakening of
state structures, of the autonomy and power of the state,” (1999, p. 13). For all intents
and purposes, if correct, this would doom any world-systems theory where states and
their agents (multi-national corporations) are the key players. However, the current
world is dominated by an elite few who control what issues are open for debate and
discourse. The range of issues open for passionate and moral engagement has been
curtailed by a new economic constitutionalism that has price and trade stability at all
(social) costs written into the statutes of the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Trade Organization and the newly created European Central Bank
and states, coupled with the economic interests they serve, have arguably been
strengthened – not weakened – by the policy constraints they themselves sought and
enacted (Hueglin 2000, p. 868).
In contrast to Beck, Wallerstein (1976; 2000; 2004; 2004) and many others like
him feel that the system will so exploit the poor within the core that there will be a global
social movement to eradicate the capitalist system as we know it. Similar to Beck in one
respect, Wallerstein has begun to recognize the growing use of technology (via the
internet and other communications means) as ways of allowing people around the world
to discuss their place within the global society. Wallerstein has begun to leave his nation-
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state centric approach, recognizing the importance of groups and individuals. However,
the author of this paper is still skeptical that this new “social forum,” to use Wallerstein’s
language, will actually be capable of generating enough momentum to destabilize the
behemoth that is the global capitalist economy. Nor does this author think that Beck’s
idea of a globally aware and communicative “risk society” will develop in such a way to
reach an outcome with the result being the minimization of risk for all members of global
society. It is true, the internet, cell phones, and the like make for much easier
communication. What is highly unlikely, however, is that vertical communication
between the elite and the “rest” will rise to a point that cooperation can occur. For
example, the forced displacement of millions of people within the dalit and adivasis
castes in India for the construction of the Sarovar Dam in India, and the Indian
government’s inability to provide proper compensation or quell fears of public health
risks highlights this problem (Dwivedi, 1999).
Certainly, underlying any world-systems analysis, one must recognize the other
factors that are play within societies at all levels. Cultural, religious, ethnic, gender and
class cleavages all play a role. However, the ultimate determining factor is power and
power is directly tied to capital accumulation. Those within power seek to maintain
power at the cost of the “rest”. All other things aside, economic factors are the major
determining factor in the world-system, and the world economic system is so deeply
rooted at this point, it seems unlikely the social revolutions within states by the poor will
eveer generate enough momentum to destabilize the system sufficiently to bring about
significant, global change.
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It is a fanciful idea, and is perhaps possible. But, what is more likely, according
to this author, is the complete and utter collapse of the capitalist system by its own
actions and its impact on the natural environment. Complex systems such as the
atmosphere, water systems, etc. are highly unpredictable and as Beck himself even notes,
risks that cannot be calculated are accepted as denied insurability (1999, pp. 31-32).
Industrial “experts” say there is no risk while insurance experts say things are too risky,
resulting in a cycle of not thinking about issues in a perverse way to ensure sanity (Beck
1999, p. 105).
Scientists really have no way of determining when a system will break down. In
other words, there is a cliff, we know it is there, but we have no way of seeing it or
determining when we will be approaching it. Thus, systems could shut down, resulting in
large-scale economic collapse around the world. It could very well be that the inevitable
global equalizer is not a revolution to replace the capitalist world economy with a more
equitable, utopian global society consisting of more localized, sustainable development.
In contrast, it could very well be that the capitalist system will so damage the natural
environment, that the earth itself revolts against our industrial processes and decides for
us that these processes must stop. The outcomes could be very similar, but the way we
get to that outcome is yet to be determined.
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APPENDIX: U.S. – Panama Treaty of 1903
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Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty),
November 18, 1903
Concluded November 18, 1903; ratification advised by the Senate February 23,
1904; ratified by President February 25,1904; ratifications exchanged February 26,
1904; proclaimed February 26, 1904. (U.S. Stats., vol. 33.)
The United States of America and the Republic of Panama being desirous to insure
the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama to connect the Atlantic and
Pacific oecans, and the Congress of the United States of America having passed an act
approved June 28, 1902, in furtherance of that object, by which the President of the
United States is authorized to acquire within a reasonable time the control of the
necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia, and the sovereignty of such territory
being actually vested in the Republic of Panama, the high contracting parties have
resolved for that purpose to conclude a convention and have accordingly appointed as
their plenipotentiaries,The President of the United States of America, John Hay, Secretary of State, and
The Government of the Republic of Panama, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama, thereunto
specially empowered by said government, who after communicating with each other their
respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and
concluded the following articles:
ARTICLE I
The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of
Panama.
ARTICLE II
The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation
and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction maintenance,
operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles extending to
the distance of five miles on each side of the center line of the route of the Canal to be
constructed; the said zone beginning in the Caribbean Sea three marine miles from mean
low water mark and extending to and across the Isthmus of Panama into the Pacific ocean
to a distance of three marine miles from mean low water mark with the proviso that the
cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities, which are included
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within the boundaries of the zone above described, shall not be included within this grant.
The Republic of Panama further grants to the United States in perpetuity the use,
occupation and control of any other lands and waters outside of the zone above described
which may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation,
sanitation and protection of the said Canal or of any auxiliary canals or other works
necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and
protection of the said enterprise.
The Republic of Panama further grants in like manner to the United States in
perpetuity all islands within the limits of the zone above described and in addition thereto
the group of small islands in the Bay of Panama, named, Perico, Naos. Culebra and
Flamenco.
ARTICLE III
The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and
authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this agreement and
within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in said Article
II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the
territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the
exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority.
ARTICLE IV
As rights subsidiary to the above grants the Republic of Panama grants in perpetuity
to the United States the right to use the rivers, streams, lakes and other bodies of water
within its limits for navigation, the supply of water or water-power or other purposes, so
far as the use of said rivers, streams, lakes and bodies of water and the waters thereof
may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation
and protection of the said Canal.
ARTICLE V
The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity a monopoly for the
construction, maintenance and operation of any system of communication by means of
canal or railroad across its territory between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific ocean.
ARTICLE VI
The grants herein contained shall in no manner invalidate the titles or rights of private
land holders or owners of private property in the said zone or in or to any of the lands or
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waters granted to the United States by the provisions of any Article of this treaty, nor
shall they interfere with the rights of way over the public roads passing through the said
zone or over any of the said lands or waters unless said rights of way or private rights
shall conflict with rights herein granted to the United States in which case. the rights of
the United States shall be superior. All damages caused to the owners of private lands or
private property of any kind by reason of the grants contained in this treaty or by reason
of the operations of the United States, its agents or employees, or by reason of the
construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal or of the
works of sanitation and protection herein provided for, shall be appraised and settled by a
joint Commission appointed by the Governments of the United States and the Republic of
Panama, whose decisions as to such damages shall be final and whose awards as to such
damages shall be paid solely by the United States. No part of the work on said Canal or
the Panama railroad or on any auxiliary works relating thereto and authorized by the
terms of this treaty shall be prevented, delayed or impeded by or pending such
proceedings to ascertain such damages. The appraisal of said private lands and private
property and the assessment of damages to them shall be based upon their value before
the date of this convention.
ARTICLE VII
The Republic of Panama grants to the United States within the limits of the cities of
Panama and Colon and their adjacent harbors and within the territory adjacent thereto the
right to acquire by purchase or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, any lands,
buildings, water rights or other properties necessary and convenient for the construction,
maintenance, operation and protection of the Canal and of any works of sanitation, such
as the collection and disposition of sewage and the distribution of water in the said cities
of Panama and Colon, which in the discretion of the United States may be necessary and
convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the
said Canal and railroad. All such works of sanitation, collection and disposition of
sewage and distribution of water in the cities of Panama and Colon shall be made at the
expense of the United States, and the Government of the United States, its agents or
nominees shall be authorized to impose and collect water rates and sewerage rates which
shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest and the amortization of the
principal of the cost of said works within a period of fifty years and upon the expiration
of said term of fifty years the system of sewers and water works shall revert to and
become the properties of the cities of Panama and Colon respectively, and the use of the
water shall be free to the inhabitants of Panama and Colon, except to the extent that water
rates may be necessary for the operation and maintenance of said system of sewers and
water.
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The Republic of Panama agrees that the cities of Panama and Colon shall comply in
perpetuity with the sanitary ordinances whether of a preventive or curative character
prescribed by the United States and in case the Government of Panama is unable or fails
in its duty to enforce this compliance by the cities of Panama and Colon with the sanitary
ordinances of the United States the Republic of Panama grants to the United States the
right and authority to enforce the same.
The same right and authority are granted to the United States for the maintenance of
public order in the cities of Panama and Colon and the territories and harbors adjacent
thereto in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the judgment of the United
States, able to maintain such order.
ARTICLE VIII
The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all rights which it now has or
hereafter may acquire to bee property of the New Panama Canal Company and the
Panama Railroad Company as a result of the transfer of sovereignty from the Republic of
Colombia to the Republic of Panama over the Isthmus of Panama and authorizes the New
Panama Canal Company to sell and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges,
properties and concessions as well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or part of
the shares of that company; lot the public lands situated outside of the zone described in
Article II of this treaty now included in the concessions to both said enterprises and not
required in the construction or operation of the Canal shall revert to the Republic of
Panama except any property now owned by or in the possession of said companies within
Panama or Colon or the ports or terminals thereof.
ARTICLE IX
The United States agrees that the ports at either entrance of the Canal and the waters
thereof, and the Republic of Panama agrees that the towns of Panama and Colon shall be
free for all time so that there shall not be imposed or collected custom house tolls,
tonnage, anchorage, lighthouse, wharf, pilot, or quarantine dues or any other charges or
taxes of any kind upon any vessel using or passing through the Canal or belonging to or
employed by the United States, directly or indirectly, in connection with the construction,
maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the main Canal, or auxiliary works,
or upon the cargo, officers, crew, or passengers of any such vessels, except such tolls and
charges as may be imposed by the United States for the use of the Canal and other works,
and except tolls and charges imposed by the Republic of Panama upon merchandise
destined to be introduced for the consumption of the rest of the Republic of Panama, and
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upon vessels touching at the ports of Colon and Panama and which do not cross the
Canal.
The Government of the Republic of Panama shall have the right to establish in such
ports and in the towns of Panama and Colon such houses and guards as it may deem
necessary to collect duties on importations destined to other portions of Panama and to
prevent contraband trade. The United Skates Shall have the right to make use of the
towns and harbors of Panama and Colon as places of anchorage, and for making repairs,
for loading, unloading, depositing, or transshipping cargoes either in transit or destined
for the service of the Canal and for other works pertaining to the Canal.
ARTICLE X
The Republic of Panama agrees that there shall not be imposed any taxes, national,
municipal, departmental, or of any other class, upon the Canal, the railways and auxiliary
works, tugs and other vessels employed in bye service of the Canal, store houses, work
shops, offices, quarters for laborers, factories of all kinds, warehouses, wharves,
machinery and other works, property, and effects appertaining to the Canal or railroad
and auxiliary works, or their officers or employees, situated within the cities of Panama
and Colon, and that there shall not be imposed contributions or charges of a personal
character of any kind upon officers, employees, laborers, and other individuals in the
service of the Canal and railroad and auxiliary works.
ARTICLE XI
The United States agrees that the official dispatches of the Government of the
Republic of Panama shall be transmitted over any telegraph and telephone lines
established for canal purposes and used for public and private business at rates not higher
than those required from officials in the service of the United States.
ARTICLE XII
The Government of the Republic of Panama shall permit the immigration and free
access to the lands and workshops of the Canal and its auxiliary works of all employees
and workmen of Whatever nationality under contract to work upon or seeking
employment upon or in any wise connected with the said Canal and its auxiliary works,
with their respective families, and all such persons shall be free and exempt from the
military service of the Republic of Panama.
ARTICLE XIII
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The United States may import at any time into the said zone and auxiliary lands, free
of custom duties, imposts, taxes, or other charges, and without any restrictions, any and
all vessels, dredges, engines, cars, machinery, tools, explosives, materials, supplies, and
other articles necessary and convenient in the construction, maintenance, operation,
sanitation and protection of the Canal and auxiliary works, and all provisions, medicines,
clothing, supplies and other things necessary and convenient for the officers, employees,
workmen and laborers in the service and employ of the United States and for their
families. If any such articles are disposed of for use outside of the zone and auxiliary
lands granted to the United States and within the territory of the Republic, they shall be
subject to the same import or other duties as like articles imported under the laws of the
Republic of Panama.
ARTICLE XIV
As the price or compensation for the rights, powers and privileges granted in this
convention by the Republic of Panama to the United States, the Government of the
United States agrees to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of ten million dollars
($10,000,000) in gold coin of the United States on the exchange of the ratification of this
convention and also an annual payment during the life of this convention of two hundred
and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) in like gold coin, beginning nine years after the date
aforesaid.
The provisions of this Article shall be in addition to all other benefits assured to the
Republic of Panama under this convention.
But no delay or difference opinion under this Article or any other provisions of this
treaty shall affect or interrupt the full operation and effect of this convention in all other
respects.
ARTICLE XV
The joint commission referred to in Article VI shall be established as follows:
The President of the United States shall nominate two persons and the President of
the Republic of Panama shall nominate two persons and they shall proceed to a decision;
but in case of disagreement of the Commission (by reason of their being equally divided
in conclusion) an umpire shall be appointed by tire two Governments who shall render
the decision. In the event of the death, absence, or incapacity of a Commissioner or
Umpire, or of his omitting, declining or ceasing to act, his place shall be filled by the
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appointment of another person in the manner above indicated. All decisions by a majority
of the Commission or by the Umpire shall be final.
ARTICLE XVI
The two Governments shall make adequate provision by future agreement for the
pursuit, capture, imprisonment, detention and delivery within said zone and auxiliary
lands to the authorities of the Republic of Panama of persons charged with the
commitment of crimes, felonies or misdemeanors without said zone and for the pursuit,
capture, imprisonment, detention and delivery without said zone to the authorities of the
United States of persons charged with the commitment of crimes, felonies and
misdemeanors within said zone and auxiliary lands.
ARTICLE XVII
The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the use of all the ports of the
Republic open to commerce as places of refuge for any vessels employed in the Canal
enterprise, and for all vessels passing or bound to pass through the Canal which may be
in distress and be driven to seek refuge in said ports. Such vessels shall be exempt from
anchorage and tonnage dues on the part of the Republic of Panama.
ARTICLE XVIII
The Canal, when constructed, and the entrances thereto shall be neutral in perpetuity,
and shall be opened upon the terms provided for by Section I of Article three of, and in
conformity with all the stipulations of, the treaty entered into by the Governments of the
United States and Great Britain on November 18,1901.
ARTICLE XIX
The Government of the Republic of Panama shall have the right to transport over the
Canal its vessels and its troops and munitions of war in such vessels at all times without
paying charges of any kind. The exemption is to be extended to the auxiliary railway for
the transportation of persons in the service of the Republic of Panama, or of the police
force charged with the preservation of public order outside of said zone, as well as to
their baggage, munitions of war and supplies.
ARTICLE XX
If by virtue of any existing treaty in relation to the territory of the Isthmus of Panama,
whereof the obligations shall descend or be assumed by the Republic of Panama, there
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may be any privilege or concession in favor the Government or the citizens and subjects
of a third power relative to an interoceanic means of communication which in any of its
terms may be incompatible with the terms of the present convention, the Republic of
Panama agrees to cancel or modify such treaty in due form, for which purpose it shall
give to the said third power the requisite notification within the term of four months from
the date of the present convention, and in case the existing treaty contains no clause
permitting its modification or annulment, the Republic of Panama agrees to procure its
modification or annulment in such form that there shall not exist any conflict with the
stipulations of the present convention.
ARTICLE XXI
The rights and privileges granted by the Republic of Panama to the United States in
the preceding Articles are understood to be free of all anterior debts, liens, trusts, or
liabilities, or concessions or privileges to other Governments, corporations, syndicates or
individuals, and consequently, if there should arise any claims on account of the present
concessions and privileges or otherwise, the claimants shall resort to the Government of
the Republic of Panama and not to the United States for any indemnity or compromise
which may be required.
ARTICLE XXII
The Republic of Panama renounces and grants to the United States the participation
to which it might be entitled in the future earnings of the Canal under Article XV of the
concessionary contract with Lucien N. B. Wyse now owned by the New Panama Canal
Company and any and all other rights or claims of a pecuniary nature arising under or
relating to said concession, or arising under or relating to the concessions to the Panama
Railroad Company or any extension or modification thereof; and it likewise renounces,
confirms and grants to the United States, now and hereafter, all the rights and property
reserved in the said concessions which otherwise would belong to Panama at or before
the expiration of the terms of ninety-nine years of the concessions granted to or held by
the above mentioned party and companies, and all right, title and interest which it now
has or many hereafter have, in and to the lands, canal, works, property and rights held by
the said companies under said concessions or otherwise, and acquired or to be acquired
by the United States from or through the New Panama Canal Company, including any
property and rights which might or may in the future either by lapse of time, forfeiture or
otherwise, revert to the Republic of Panama, under any contracts or concessions, with
said Wyse, the Universal Panama Canal Company, the Panama Railroad Company and
the New Panama Canal Company.
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The aforesaid rights and property shall be and are free and released from any present
or reversionary interest in or claims of Panama and the title of the United States thereto
upon consummation of the contemplated purchase by the United States from the New
Panama Canal (company, shall be absolute, so far as concerns the Republic of Panama,
excepting always the rights of the Republic specifically secured under this treaty.
ARTICLE XXIII
If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed forces for the safety or
protection of the Canal, or of the ships that make use of the same, or the railways and
auxiliary works, the United States shall have the right, at all times and in its discretion, to
use its police and its land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for these purposes.
ARTICLE XXIV
No change either in the Government or in the laws and treaties of the Republic of
Panama shall, without the consent of the United States, affect any right of the United
States under the present convention, or under any treaty stipulation between the two
countries that now exists or may hereafter exist touching the subject matter of this
convention.
If the Republic of Panama shall hereafter enter as a constituent into any other
Government or into any union or confederation of states, so as to merge her sovereignty
or independence in such Government, union or confederation, the rights of the United
States under this convention shall not be in any respect lessened or impaired.
ARTICLE XXV
For the better performance of the engagements of this convention and to the end of
the efficient protection of the Canal and the preservation of its neutrality, the Government
of the Republic of Panama will sell or lease to the United States lands adequate and
necessary for naval or coaling stations on the Pacific coast and on the western Caribbean
coast of the Republic at certain points to be agreed upon with the President of the United
States.
ARTICLE XXVI
This convention when signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Parties shall
be ratified by the respective Governments and the ratifications shall be exchanged at
Washington at the earliest date possible.
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In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention
in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their respective seals.
Done at the City of Washington the 18th day of November in the year of our Lord
nineteen hundred and three.
JOHN HAY [SEAL]
P. BUNAU VARILLA [SEAL]
Source:
Inter-American relations; collection of documents, legislation, descriptions of inter-American
organizations, and other material pertaining to inter-American affairs.
Compiled by Barry Sklar and Virginia M. Hagen
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972
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